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ABSTARCT

Populations have faced significant challenges due to globalization, demographic ageing, and
new social risks. These challenges have brought noteworthy pressures for pension systems,
particularly as the large baby boom cohorts begin to exit the labour market. This thesis
considers the recent developments in pension systems in OECD countries in light of path
dependency associated with a four-fold welfare regime typology—namely the Social
Democratic, the Liberal, Continental, and Southern European regimes. This thesis shows that
pension regimes mainly follow a welfare regime typology based on differential responsibility
for welfare distribution on the part of the market, the state, the family, and local actors.
This thesis takes the form of three distinct, though logically-interrelated, manuscripts.
The following issues have been particularly examined in this research. First, the thesis
examines the distribution of welfare with special emphasis on the elderly. Second, it
examines the question of path dependency of pension policy characteristics across OECD
countries. Third, it discusses the outcomes of welfare distribution and pension policies
especially with reference to gender and generations.
Based on OECD data, Chapter 2 scrutinizes the differential pension policies, and
places 19 OECD countries into a welfare regime typology that characterizes institutional
similarities and differences. This chapter confirms that the institutional characteristics of
welfare regimes matter despite the convergence that might be expected from economic and
demographic changes. Analysing the conceptual foundation of previous research, Chapter 3
examines the latest economic and demographic trends in pension policies in OECD countries
iii

in light of a path dependency approach. This chapter concludes that there is no single path for
pension reform. While there are some variations, welfare states mostly follow their
traditional paths, which differ across welfare regime groups. Examining the Turkish welfare
regime, Chapter 4 discusses the welfare of the old with special focus on the pension system.
This chapter highlights the roles of the state, the family, the market, and local actors in
welfare distribution, with particular emphasis on the state. This chapter concludes that in
spite of noteworthy pension reforms seeking to achieve a fair pension system for all groups,
the Turkish pension system has still some inequality problems in terms of gender and
generations.

Key words: Welfare Regime, Welfare State, Pension Systems, Population Ageing,
Typology, Inequalities, Turkey.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Our world, particularly the industrialized countries, has faced various social and
economic challenges in the beginning of the 21st century. One of the most significant
challenges that afflicts state budgets and increases financial concerns, is the increasing
number of elderly in industrialized countries. The considerable declines in mortality and
fertility have given rise to a gradual increase in the ratio of older to younger people in the
population. The decline in fertility brought “ageing at the bottom,” with smaller numbers
of young people (Caldwell and Schindlmayr 2003; McDonald 2006), while the mortality
improvements at older ages have contributed to “ageing at the top” (Legare 2001;
Beaujot and Kerr 2004; Bongaarts 2006). According to the United Nations population
projections (2011), the world’s population 65 and older is projected to almost triple by
the second half of the 21st century, from about 524 million in 2010 to 1.51 billion in 2050
in the medium variant. The population under 15, however, is expected to increase by only
3 percent during the same period, from 1.85 billion to 1.91 billion.
Demographic ageing is partly a product of both success and failure of the
welfare state. It is a success of the welfare state because important improvements in
healthcare and state involvement in social services led to sharp falls first in the infant
mortality and then in old-age mortality. Over the 19th and 20th centuries, life expectancy
at birth has doubled from 40 years to about 80 years (Bongaarts 2006: 605). Decline in
1

mortality rates and increase in the life expectancy at birth resulted in demographic ageing
at the top. It was partly a failure of the welfare state because some states such as Italy and
Greece were not able to provide social and economic resources that help couples to attain
their intended number of children. In addition to cultural changes (Lesthaeghe 1995) and
increase in women’s education levels (McDonald 2006), social policies also affect
fertility rates (see for example, Del Boca and Wetzels 2008). The significant gap between
intended and achieved fertility rates might be evidence for a lack of adequate state
support in childcare (Beaujot and Wang 2010).
The continuing change in the demographic structure of the world’s population
poses significant challenges to societies, economies, and families, in terms of meeting the
needs of the various sectors of the population. In addition to demographic challenges,
economic fluctuations brought new risks to societies through their effects on
unemployment rates and pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension systems. In this circumstance,
the welfare state and the distribution of welfare in a society have become significant
discussion topics in academic and policy circles.
It seems to me, there are two main research topics to understand social and
demographic trends in welfare of societies. The first topic is demographic ageing and its
challenges to social welfare. The second research topic is the distribution of welfare in
ageing societies. This thesis mainly focuses on welfare distribution in ageing populations
with special emphasis on the welfare of the old and pension policies.

2

1.1. Study Objectives and Research Questions
The main purpose of this thesis is to make a contribution to the welfare state literature
focusing on ageing and pension policies. This thesis first seeks to examine the
distribution of welfare with special emphasis on the elderly. Second, it aims to examine
the question of path dependency of pension policy characteristics, using quantitative
OECD data (Chapter 2), analysing conceptual foundation of previous research (Chapter
3), and examining Turkish pension reforms as a case study (Chapter 4). By comparing
various OECD countries, their differential pension characteristics can be placed in a
typology that helps to understand similarities and differences. Third, this thesis discusses
the outcomes of welfare distribution and pension policies especially by reference to
gender and generations. Turkey, which has a social security deficit despite its young
population, was chosen to understand particular pension characteristics in welfare
distribution. This study shows that pension variations across OECD countries support a
four-fold welfare regime typology. Welfare regimes largely follow their institutional
paths in their pension policies despite the convergence that might be expected from
similar demographic and economic challenges.
In light of these objectives, this thesis seeks to answer the following research
questions. How is welfare distributed in a society? What are the main pillars in the
production of welfare? What are the variations among different welfare states? While
there are some demographic similarities in ageing populations across countries, are they
following similar pension policy paths? As some claim, are all of the different welfare
regimes becoming liberal due to neo-liberal globalization or is there some pathdependency in these clusters? Does Esping-Andersen’s three-fold classification of
3

welfare regimes need reconstruction with new clusters? What are the similarities and
differences in terms of pension policies among these countries? How do pension
inequalities, especially with regard to gender and generation, vary across welfare
regimes?
1.2. Research Method and Data
The methodology to be used in analyzing the welfare of the old in the various regimes
depends on quantitative secondary data and previous studies on welfare states and
pension policies. Since this is a cross-national comparative research, I will use mostly
comparative data on pension policies, labour market, and demographic indicators from
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (henceforth OECD) and
the Turkish Statistic Institute (henceforth TURKSTAT).
The OECD data are used to create selected variables and to perform cluster
analyses in the second chapter. Considerable institutional differences among countries
make it difficult to obtain accurate and comparable data on pension policies. However,
the availability of cross-national OECD data on pension policies and labour markets
make it possible to compare pension policies in different welfare regimes (Castles 2008).
In particular, the three volumes of Pensions at a Glance (OECD 2005, 2007, 2009) have
been used to obtain the data for this research. Details of data, variables, and methodology
will be discussed in the methodology section of the second chapter.
Since the third chapter focuses on theoretical and conceptual discussions
regarding the welfare state, the family, ageing, and pension policies, descriptive statistics
from OECD and UN data on pensions, families, demographic indicators, and labour
4

market characteristics are invoked. In addition to evaluating the analyses of other
researchers, my research objectives will be realized through studying the cross-national
pension reforms and the associated OECD reports, and analyzing the way in which the
costs and benefits of the pension systems have been distributed across population groups.
The fourth chapter is a case study on the welfare of the old in Turkey. OECD and
TURKSTAT data will be used to understand the transformation of the Turkish welfare
regime, family structure and pension policies. Pension reform drafts, strategic plans for
various state departments, such as Social Security Institution and State Planning
Organization will also be invoked in order to understand the rationale behind pension
reforms.
1.3. Background, Concepts, and Literature Review
1.3.1. Definitions: Welfare, Welfare State, Social Policy
In order to understand the dynamics that affect the distribution of welfare and social
policy variations among countries, the term welfare should first be examined. Welfare is
defined as the condition of being or doing well. In other words, it is the well-being of
individuals’ health, happiness, safety, and prosperity (for discussions, see Spicker 2000).
The concept “welfare” is used when some action is necessary in order to enhance
reasonable and adequate life for individuals (Marshall 1998: 701). Therefore, the term
welfare not only includes a minimum level of income, but also education, housing,
employment, and healthcare. Welfare can be distributed by different actors, such as
families, religious organizations, voluntary organizations, and governments. Since
welfare distribution generally necessitates macro socio-economic regulations, the concept
5

of welfare is mostly employed in the public policy arena. Therefore, the bulk of welfare
research focuses on the state and state provisions.
There is no commonly agreed understanding of the welfare state. According to
Pierson (2007), in a narrow sense, the welfare state refers to state provisions to meet the
welfare needs of society through social services and income transfers. In a broader sense,
the welfare state is a society in which the state is involved in the process of redistribution
(Pierson 2007). The term social policy is another significant concept, when the welfare
state and its provisions are considered. Social policies often refer to government
programs which aim to achieve social harmony among social groups. Marshall (1964),
one of the prominent figures in the welfare state literature, explains social policy with
regard to state actions having a direct effect on the welfare of people through social
services and income benefits. Beland (2010: 28) emphasizes five chief social policy areas
achieved by the welfare state: i) work, and unemployment, ii) pensions, iii) health care,
iv) housing, and v) family benefits.
1.3.2. History of the Welfare State
According to some researchers, the roots of the welfare state may be traced back to the
early 19th century. For Pierson (2007: 106), “welfare states tended to emerge in societies
in which capitalism and the nation state were both already well established and these preexisting economic and state formations have themselves prescribed the limits of
subsequent welfare state development”. Rosanvallon (2004: 20-21), however, criticizes
researchers who consider the welfare state as peculiar to the 19th and 20th centuries and
why associated with capitalism and socialism. For him, the roots of the welfare state may

6

go back to the emergence of nation states in Europe. Contrary to Rosanvallon (2004), a
significant number of researchers agree on the emergence of the welfare state after the
Second World War (Pierson 2007: 105). However, it is more accurate to assume the
emergence of the modern welfare state in the late 19th century. In order to solve mainly
the problems of employees and to regulate labour markets, an organized system of state
welfare provision was first introduced by Bismarck in Germany. The introduction of
industrial accident provisions in 1871 in Germany was the first social service,
demonstrating the state’s role in the management of social risks. Health services in 1883
and pension system in 1889 followed the provisions for industrial accidents. In addition
to these social services, unemployment compensation and family allowances were
introduced in many countries after the Second World War (see Table 1.1).

7

Table 1.1.
Introduction of Major Social Policy Programs in Some OECD Countries
Industrial
Accident

Health

Pension

Unemployment

Family
Allowance

Austria

1887

1888

1927

1920

1921

Canada

1930

1971

1927

1940

1944

Denmark

1898

1892

1891

1907

1952

Finland

1895

1963

1937

1917

1948

France

1898

1898

1895

1905

1932

Germany

1871

1883

1889

1927

1954

Greece

1914

1922

1934

1954

1958

Ireland

1897

1911

1908

1911

1945

Italy

1898

1886

1898

1919

1936

Netherlands

1901

1929

1913

1916

1940

New Zealand

1900

1938

1898

1938

1926

Norway

1894

1909

1936

1906

1946

Spain

1900

1929

1914

1919

1938

Sweden

1901

1891

1913

1934

1947

Turkey

1945

1950

1949

1999

1945

U.K.

1897

1911

1908

1911

1945

U.S.

1930

2010

1935

1935

-

Sources: Pierson 2007: 110; US Social Security Administration, 2010,
http://ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/ssptw/

8

Historically, the management of social risks does not have to be related to unemployment
or old-age risk as we understand them in modern times. Providing life security for people
or forming general rules and laws could be important duties of a state seeking the
management of social risks. However, as Esping-Andersen (1999: 33) states, “until the
20th century, most risks were not considered social, that is, a matter of state”. In the 20th
century, we witnessed noteworthy improvements in dealing with social risks, such as
social services and health care over the life-course. However, new social risks, which
were not considered social risks before, were emerging, such as old-age and
environmental problems. As Peloquin (et al. 2011: 1) asserted, “the pattern of risk and
risk perceptions is not constant” and our perception of social risks change over time. For
example, while insecurity and famine were the most important social risks for many
centuries, the main social risks for industrialized countries in the 21st century may be
poor health, unemployment, disability, and old-age.
In the second half of the 20th century, due to the state’s ability to manage social
risks through its institutions and resources, the modern state became an important player.
While the modern welfare state emerged in the late 19th century in Germany, it became
institutionalized after the Second World War with Keynesian economic policies and
Beveridge’s full employment and social security targets.
While the rationale behind the emergence of the modern welfare state is different
according to various ideologies (for different ideologies and explanations see Mullard
and Spicker 1998; Pierson 2007) the state emerged as an active player in welfare
distribution in the mid 20th century. It could be argued that the state’s significant
involvement in social welfare stemmed from unexpected social and economic situations
9

in post-war societies. The state’s noteworthy role continued, even increased, in an
economic and social atmosphere based on high economic growth and mass employment
in the second half of the 20th century. Hence, the modern state took substantial
responsibility for addressing social risks. It sought to cope with social problems and risks
that were previously managed by families. The increasing role of the state in the
production of welfare meant that families played a lesser role in the distribution of
welfare. However, in history, the family and local actors were the main players in welfare
distribution, with production and redistribution based in the household.
At the end of the 20th century, however, according to Pierson (2007) the welfare
state was challenged by three main factors—globalization, demographic changes, and
new social risks. For many researchers, socio-economic challenges and financial
problems often led to claims of a “crisis” of the welfare state as a result of financial
problems (O’Connor 1973), growing social expenditures (OECD 1981), contradictions of
the welfare state (Offe 1984), and globalization (Mishra 1999).
According to Ferrera and Rhodes (2000), the erosion of the ideological consensus
and economic crises have led to recasting of the European welfare states. Economic
globalization has generated a debate on neo-liberal convergence as states are increasingly
cutting their social expenditures and people are increasingly relying on the market for
social services. Moreno and Palier (2004) argued that the Continental and Southern
European welfare states have transformed into semi-sovereign political structures with
neo-liberal ideas. Privatization of the social services and individualization of social risks
are main markers of the neo-liberalization process. The convergence approach asserts that
since welfare states are adopting policies of retrenchment and neo-liberalization, there is
10

a process of neo-liberal convergence of welfare states in Europe. Hence, the extent to
which welfare regimes are stable and path dependent is under debate due to mainly neoliberalization process in various welfare regimes.
According to institutionalist perspective, however, the transformation of welfare
states is largely a product of earlier institutionalized features; and changes are constrained
by existing institutional arrangements (Myles and Pierson 2001). The path dependency
approach was used to highlight the effects of economic and political institutions on
political changes in history. Institutional thinkers argue that political institutions
constructed earlier in history have significant impacts on policy making process at later
points in time (Jochem 2007). While the economics literature on path dependency played
an important role in Pierson’s (2001) and Mahoney’s (2000) works, other institutionalists
(for example, Thelen 2004) focus on new mechanisms of institutional change such as
including layering and conversion, in path dependency discussions (Boas 2007: 34).
However, most of them agree with the idea that the transformation of welfare regimes is
largely a product of earlier institutionalized features; and changes are constrained by
existing institutional arrangements (Mahoney 2000; Myles and Pierson 2001; Thelen
2004).
Contrary to other researchers, who assert there is a radical change in the welfare
state, Esping-Andersen (1996) claims that since the welfare state institutionalized over a
long period of time, it is resistant to change. For example, due to the extensive pension
programs in industrialized countries, radical pension reforms face considerable social and
political resistances (Myles and Pierson 2001; Myles 2002). Hence, as Esping-Andersen
(1996) argues, the contemporary situation of the welfare state is “frozen”.
11

It could be argued that in contrast to the “golden age” of the welfare state in the
1960s, which was based on high economic growth, full employment, and stable social
institutions, it is more difficult for the state to cope with new challenges such as
globalization, demographic changes, and new social risks in the 21st century.
Consequently, one outcome is for the welfare state to further collaborate with other
welfare actors—the market, the family, and local actors—in the distribution of welfare.
Therefore, rather than a “welfare state crisis” or “welfare state retrenchment”, the new era
could be defined as a restructuration of the function of welfare distribution among
welfare actors—the market, the family, and local actors. This restructuration process
necessitates the detailed consideration of other welfare actors.
1.3.3. Welfare Regime
The focus on public expenditures is insufficient to understand the welfare distribution in
contemporary societies (Esping-Andersen 1990: 2-3). Contrary to the concept of the
“welfare state”, which is narrowly associated with public expenditures, the term “welfare
regime” focuses on not only public expenditures, but also the market, the family, and
local actors in welfare distribution. In the welfare regime approach, societies are grouped
not only in terms of how their social policies are constructed through welfare actors, but
also in terms of how different welfare regimes influence social institutions, such as the
family and local actors (Esping-Andersen 1990).
The welfare regime conceptualization is an effort to classify different welfare
groups through analyses based on political economy and cross-national comparison.
Gough (2001: 166) highlights two central features in defining welfare regimes: “(i) the
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pattern of state social policies and programmes, usually distinguishing social assistance,
social insurance and universal citizenship modes of distributing benefits in cash and in
kind; (ii) the wider pattern of welfare provisioning in society, usually in terms of the
division of responsibility between the state, the market, and the household.” The first
feature of welfare regimes resembles the definition of the welfare state concept, while the
second feature has a broader meaning which emphasizes the role of other welfare actors
in welfare distribution. Hence, focusing on societies and social actors helps us better
understand the welfare mix of societies and allows for a broader cross-national
comparative analysis. In addition, the welfare regime approach could assist us in
understanding state-society relations throughout history as well as contemporary
developments in social policy literature. Using the concept of the welfare regime denotes
the fact that state, economy, and society are systematically intertwined in welfare
distribution. Hence, this thesis aims to achieve a broader comparative study which takes
into consideration about 20 OECD countries with special emphasis on the welfare of the
old in welfare regimes.
Esping-Andersen (1999) asserts that there are three actors—namely, the state, the
market and the family—in the management of social risks. In order to widen the welfare
state literature, Esping-Andersen (1990) first used the term “welfare state regime” or
“welfare regime” and he considered other welfare actors in his analyses. However,
similar to most welfare state researchers, he generally focuses on state policies rather than
on the social characteristics of welfare regimes. Contrary to many welfare state studies,
this thesis emphasizes the role of four main welfare actors—the family, the market, the
state, and local actors in the distribution of welfare. Many researchers do not consider the
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importance of local actors as a fourth pillar in welfare distribution. It seems to me that
local actors play important roles in meeting the welfare needs of individuals through nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), non-profit organizations, religious institutions,
neighbourhood or kin groups. For example, while there is an emphasis on churches,
charities, and private agencies for the welfare of the individual in the U.S.,
neighbourhood and kin groups play considerable roles together with families in welfare
distribution in Turkey. However, there are few studies examining the influence of local
actors in welfare distribution (Aspalter 2002).
1.3.4. Classifying Welfare Regimes
Welfare state researchers have mostly preferred to focus on class and political institutions
in social policy discussions (Marshall 1964; O’Connor 1973; Offe 1984). Despite the
importance of these dynamics in the welfare state discussions, there are other dynamics
such as families, local actors, and gender that have noteworthy impacts on welfare
distribution. For example, while earning and caring roles in families may be heavily
influenced by the characteristics of the welfare state, the characteristics of families may
also influence social and economic policies of the welfare state. These variations along
different welfare regimes show the importance of groupings of welfare regimes.
As illustrated in Table 1.2, the classification of welfare states occupies much
research attention (Esping-Andersen 1990; Leibfried 1992; Castles and Mitchell 1993;
Ferrera 1996; Bonoli 1997; Korpi and Palme 1998; Trifiletti 1999). Titmuss (1974) is
among the first researchers who classified welfare states by using a three-fold typology—
the residual welfare model, the industrial achievement-performance model, and the
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institutional redistributive model. Subsequently, Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999) is the one
who has extensively influenced welfare state discussions through using a comparative
approach in welfare regime clustering. It is difficult to find a study comparing welfare
states or social policies in different countries that does not refer to his study, entitled The
Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Arts and Gelissen 2002). In this book, EspingAndersen (1990) constructed today’s best-known three-fold typology of welfare states—
the Social Democratic, the Liberal, and the Corporatist—based on 18 OECD countries in
the 1980s.
According to Esping-Andersen (1990: 2-3), traditional analyses of the welfare
state centering on public expenditures are inadequate, and his conceptualization which
emphasizes de-commodification, social stratification, and employment, offers an
alternative and broader approach to welfare state literature. The concept of decommodification refers to interference of the state with the economy so that a person can
maintain his or her life without dependence on the market (Esping-Andersen 1990: 2122). Social stratification demonstrates that the welfare state not only attempts to mitigate
social inequalities, but also recreates a system of stratification (Esping-Andersen 1990:
23). This stratification is an active force in the ordering of social relations and the welfare
system
Despite Esping-Andersen’s significant influence on comparative social policy
analysis, there have been significant critiques of his methodology (Powell and Barrientos
2004) and three-fold typology (Leibfried 1992; Castles and Mitchell 1993; Ferrera 1996;
Korpi and Palme 1998; Scruggs and Allan 2006). Even though some of these studies
address significant drawbacks of his study, they do not test Esping-Andersen’s
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classification in terms of pension policies in the 2000s. Hence, one of the purposes of this
thesis is to make a contribution to the further development and operationalisation of
Esping-Andersen’s welfare regime by using OECD data on pension and social
expenditure.
The study of pension reforms in the light of welfare regime typology is helpful in
understanding the diversity of experiences among different societies and the historical
embeddedness of existing welfare groups. This approach helps to clarify whether
different welfare states are really being dismantled and whether the liberal group has
become dominant in the last decades. It is important to scrutinize both the political
process and the policy profile of pension reforms in studying the characteristics of
pension systems and their change (Jochem 2007).
A welfare regime typology based on “ideal types”, is useful for mapping the field
of social policy (Beland 2010: 40) and has some explanatory value for comparative
political sociology. Contrary to Esping-Andersen’s “ideal world” of welfare states, there
are additional variations among welfare states, and the “real world’” of welfare states is
likely to show more complex and hybrid forms (Arts and Gelissen 2002: 139). Having
this in mind, in this thesis I will use a four-fold typology of welfare regime—the Social
Democratic, the Liberal, the Continental European and the Southern European. It seems
appropriate to classify the South European countries as a separate cluster due to the
strong role of the family and moderate role of the state in welfare distribution. In this
thesis, in addition to Italy, Greece, Spain, and Portugal, Turkey is classified within the
Southern European welfare regime. Turkey has revealed significant similarities with
other Southern European countries through its familialistic structure, the residual nature
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of social assistance, and patronage. Different welfare regimes and variations within
groups will be elaborated in the next chapters.

Table 1.2.
An Overview of Typologies of Welfare Regimes
Types of welfare states and their characteristics Countries
EspingAndersen
(1990)

Leibfried
(1992)

Castles
and
Mitchell
(1993)

Siaroff
(1994)

1. Liberal: Low level of decommodification; marketdifferentiation of welfare

Australia, Canada, Ireland, New
Zealand, UK, USA

2. Conservative: Moderate level of decommodification; social
benefits mainly dependent on former contributions and status

Finland, France, Germany, Japan,
Italy, Switzerland

3. Social Democratic: High level of decommodification; universal
benefits and high degree of benefit equality
1. Anglo–Saxon (Residual): Right to income transfers; welfare
state as compensator of last resort and tight enforcer of work in the
market place

Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden
Australia, New Zealand, UK, USA

2. Bismarck (Institutional): Right to social security; welfare state
as compensator of first resort and employer of last resort

Austria, Germany

3. Scandinavian (Modern): Right to work for everyone;
universalism; welfare state as employer of first resort and
compensator of last resort

Denmark, Finland, Norway,
Sweden

4. Latin Rim (Rudimentary): Right to work and welfare
proclaimed; welfare state as a semiinstitutionalized promise
1. Liberal: Low level of decommodification; marketdifferentiation of welfare

France, Greece, Italy, Portugal,
Spain
Ireland, Japan, Switzerland, UK,
USA

2. Conservative: High social expenditures, but little adoption of
equalizing instruments in social policy

Germany, Italy, Netherlands

3. Non-Right Hegemony: High social expenditure and use of
highly equalizing instruments in social policy

Belgium. Denmark, Norway,
Sweden

4. Radical: Achievement of equality in pre-tax, pre-transfer
income (adoption of equalizing instruments in social policy), but
little social spending
1. Protestant Liberal: Minimal family welfare, yet relatively
egalitarian gender situation in the labour market; family benefits
are paid to the mother, but are rather inadequate

Australia, Ireland, New Zealand,
UK

Decommodification,
stratification

Poverty, social
insurance, poverty
policy

Aggregate welfare
expenditure, benefit
equality, welfare
expenditure

Australia, Canada, New Zealand,
UK, USA

2. Advanced Christian-Democratic: No strong incentives for
women to work, but strong incentives to stay at home

Austria, Belgium, France,
Germany, Luxemburg,
Netherlands

3. Protestant Social-Democratic: True work-welfare choice for
women; family benefits are high and always paid to the mother;
importance of Protestantism being paid to women

Denmark, Finland, Norway,
Sweden

4. Late Female Mobilization: Absence of Protestantism; family
benefits are usually paid to the father; universal female suffrage is
relatively new

Indicators

Family welfare
orientation, female
work desirability,
extent of family
benefits

Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Portugal, Spain, Switzerland
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Table 1.2.
An Overview of Typologies of Welfare Regimes (cont.)

Ferrera (1996)

Bonoli (1997)

Types of welfare states and their characteristics

Countries

1. Anglo-Saxon: Fairly high welfare state cover; social assistance with a
means test; highly integrated organizational framework entirely
managed by a public administration

Ireland, UK

2. Bismarck: Strong link between work position and social
entitlements; financing through contributions; reasonably substantial
social assistance benefits; insurance schemes mainly governed by unions
and employer organizations

Belgium, France, Germany,
France, Luxembourg,
Netherlands

3. Scandinavian: Social protection as a citizenship right; universal
coverage; relatively generous fixed benefits for various social risks;
financing mainly through fiscal revenues

Denmark, Finland,
Norway, Sweden

4. Southern: Fragmented system of income guarantees linked to work
position; generous benefits without articulated net of minimum social
protection; health care as a right of citizenship; arrangements
particularism in payments of cash benefits and financing; financing
through contributions and fiscal revenues
1. British: Low percentage of social expenditure financed through
contributions (Beveridge); low social expenditure as a percentage of
GDP
2. Continental: High percentage of social expenditure financed through
contributions (Bismarck); high social expenditure as a percentage of
GDP
3. Nordic: Low percentage of social expenditure financed through
contributions (Beveridge); high social expenditure as a percentage of
GDP
4. Southern: High percentage of social expenditure financed through
contributions (Bismarck); low social expenditure as a percentage of
GDP
1. Basic Security: Entitlements based on citizenship or contributions;
application of the flat-rate benefit principle

Greece, Italy, Portugal,
Spain

2. Corporatist: Entitlements based on occupational category and labour
force participation; use of the earnings-related benefit principle
Korpi and
Palme (1998)

Rules of access
(eligibility),
benefit formulae,
financing
regulations,
organizational–
managerial
arrangements

Ireland, UK

Belgium, France, Germany,
France, Netherlands
Denmark, Finland,
Norway, Sweden

Bismarck and
Beveridge model,
quantity of
welfare state
expenditure

Greece, Italy, Portugal,
Spain, Switzerland
Canada, Denmark, Ireland,
Netherlands, New Zealand,
Switzerland, UK, USA
Austria, Belgium, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan

3. Encompassing: Entitlement based on citizenship and labour force
participation; use of the flat-rate and earnings-related benefit principle

Finland, Norway, Sweden

4. Targeted: Eligibility based on proved need; use of the minimum
benefit principle

Australia

5. Voluntary State Subsidized: Eligibility based on membership or
contributions; application of the flat-rate or earnings-related principle

Indicators

Bases of
entitlement,
benefit principle,
governance of
social insurance
programme

-

Source: Arts and Gelissen 2002: 143-144; 149-150.

Following the four-fold typology, Table 1.3 presents the priority of the welfare actors in
welfare distribution. The Liberal welfare regime is distinguished by the leading role of
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the market in welfare distribution, with lower responsibility on the part of the state and
the family. In this regime there are modest universal transfers, modest social insurance
plans, and a focus on means-tested assistance. The chief role of the state is to restore the
self-sufficiency of the individual and the family, and to deter dependency on the state. In
the Social Democratic welfare regime, the state plays the key role rather than the market,
the family and the local actors in meeting the social needs of citizens. This regime
promotes a high standard of social equality where all people are incorporated under one
universal system. The Continental European countries reflect a strongly conservative and
corporatist tradition. The main characteristics of this regime are the emphasis on the
preservation of status differentials, and the institutionalization of rights attached to class
and status rather than citizenship. The Continental welfare regime is, hence, criticized as
being paternalistic, hierarchical, and gender biased. Contrary to the Liberal welfare
regime, the state plays a relatively active role in the welfare distribution. In the Southern
European welfare regime, the family remains the key actor in welfare distribution, while
the state plays a moderate role. Populism and patronage are two indirect welfare
distribution mechanisms used by governments to get voters’ political support in the
elections. In addition to the family, local actors have relatively higher roles in welfare
distribution.

19

Table 1.3.
Relative Priority of Actors in Welfare Distribution
Liberal

Social
Democratic

Continental
Europe

Southern
Europe

State

Low

High

Moderate

Moderate

Market

High

Low

Moderate

Moderate

Family

Low

Low

Moderate

High

Local Actors

High

Moderate

Moderate

High

Source: Author’s judgments as elaborated in the text.

1.4. Thesis Outline
This thesis takes the form of three distinct, though logically interrelated manuscripts
supported by introduction and conclusion chapters. The relevant literature and
methodology of the studies are discussed in each chapter, as are the policy implications.
A general discussion and concluding remarks are presented in the conclusion chapter.
The second chapter, entitled “Pension regimes and inequalities across OECD
countries” will appear in the forthcoming book, entitled Ageing Populations in PostIndustrial Democracies, published by Routledge Publishing House. This chapter aims to
place pension policy discussions in a welfare regime context. By comparing 19 OECD
countries, this chapter first examines the question of the path dependency of pension
policy characteristics, using OECD data on pension systems. Secondly, it analyzes the
differential pension policies, and places countries into a welfare regime typology that
characterizes the institutional similarities and differences across OECD countries.
Finally, unlike the existing body of knowledge on pension policy typologies, this chapter
examines the outcomes of pension policies by reference to gender and generations. This
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chapter shows that the institutional characteristics of welfare regimes still matter despite
the convergence that might be expected from economic and demographic changes. In
addition, it is important to consider gender and generations in describing patterns of
pension systems and inequalities within and across welfare regimes. This chapter shows
that compared to other welfare regimes, gender inequalities are less serious in the Social
Democratic welfare regime where there is higher social spending for women and the
young. Generational inequalities are more serious in the Southern European welfare
regime compared to other groups with high youth unemployment (aged 20-24) rates and
old-age expenditures.
The third chapter, entitled “Welfare regimes for ageing populations: No single
path for reform” was published in the December 2009 volume of Population and
Development Review. This chapter examines recent trends in pension policies in OECD
countries in light of both demographic ageing and path dependency associated with the
welfare regime typology—namely the Social Democratic, the Liberal, the Continental
European, and the Southern European regimes. These regime types represent different
responsibilities assumed for social security on the part of the market, the state, and the
family. While there are significant differences in labour market characteristics, the
demographic similarities in ageing bring similar pressures for pension reforms across
OECD countries. These reforms address fiscal issues in state pensions, typically by
increasing the length of the working life, placing more of the pension responsibility on
individuals, or converting to defined-contribution approaches. This chapter shows that
there is no single path for pension reform. While there are some variations, welfare states
tend to follow their traditional paths, which differ across welfare regime types.
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The fourth chapter entitled “The Welfare of the old: The Turkish welfare regime
and Turkish pension policies,” is a case study on the welfare of the old in Turkey and the
Turkish welfare regime. Welfare regimes of newly industrializing countries and their
responses to challenges of population ageing and pension systems are generally
overlooked in the study of the welfare state literature. The Turkish case, which has not
been very well studied, is an interesting example due to Turkey’s young population but
high old-age expenditures. This chapter highlights the roles of the state, the family, the
market, and local actors in welfare distribution, with particular emphasis on pension
policies. Furthermore, it examines whether a neo-liberal economic process leads the
Turkish welfare regime to adopt the characteristics of the Liberal welfare regime. There
are two main objectives in this chapter. First, it aims to highlight major characteristics of
the Turkish welfare regime and its pension policies. That is, it seeks to examine how the
welfare regime has evolved in view of actors representing the interests of state, market,
family, and local actors. Second, it aims to analyze the ways in which the Turkish welfare
regime and its pension policies are affecting the welfare of the old across gender and
generations. That is, it seeks to scrutinize how the pension system and its transformation
are affecting equity across gender and generations. This chapter shows that despite
important pension reforms seeking to achieve a fair pension system for all groups, the
Turkish pension system has still some inequality problems in terms of generations and
genders. The main problem for generational equality is the lack of well-paid standard
jobs for the young, while the main problem for gender equality is gendered division of
labour.
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CHAPTER 2
PENSION REGIMES AND INEQUALITIES ACROSS OECD
COUNTRIES

Chapter 2 has been removed because of copyright restrictions. This chapter will appear in
the forthcoming book by editors Pieter Vanhuysse and Achim Goerres, entitled Ageing
Populations in PostIndustrial Democracies, in 2011 (London: Routledge,
9780415603829).
Publisher link: http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415603829/

2.1. Abstract
Socio-economic challenges and the need to reform welfare programs have often led to
claims of a ‘crisis’ of the welfare state as a result of growing new social expenditure
demands (O’Connor 1973; OECD 1981; Mishra 1984; Offe 1984). For other researchers,
the contemporary trends in welfare state development represent retrenchment, and
pension reforms across OECD countries are the key indicators of this development
(Brown 1988; Starke 2006; Meyer 1998; Green-Pedersen 2002; Häusermann 2010).
Contrary to the neo-liberal convergence thesis, however, some studies show that while
the demographic and economic challenges are similar across OECD countries, different
welfare states have developed varying retirement and employment policies following
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their institutional paths (Esping-Andersen 1999, 2002; Pierson 2001; Castles 2004;
Aysan and Beaujot 2009; Busemeyer 2009; Tepe and Vanhuysse 2009).
By comparing 19 OECD countries, this chapter first examines the question of the
path dependency of pension policy characteristics with recent quantitative data. Secondly,
using cluster analysis techniques, it places countries into a typology that characterizes the
institutional similarities and differences across OECD countries. This chapter looks at the
outcomes of pension policies especially by reference to gender and generations. This
study shows that the institutional characteristics of welfare regimes still matter for
inequalities and other outcomes in spite of the convergence that might be expected from
very similar economic and demographic changes.
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2.2. Appendices
Box 2.A.1.
List of Pension Regime Variables
1. Institutional variables
Public expenditure for old
Old-age expenditure in % of GDP, (2003-2005). OECD 2010a, OECD 2010b.
Government spending on old-age, (2003-2005). OECD 2010a, OECD 2010b.
Labour force participation and retirement age
Labour force participation rate for men 65 and over, (2004-2008). OECD 2010a.
Official retirement age for men, (2002 -2007). OECD 2006.
Pension wealth and pension replacement
Weighted average pension level for men, (2005-2009). OECD 2005, OECD 2007, OECD
2009.
Weighted average pension wealth for men, (2005-2009). OECD 2005, OECD 2007,
OECD 2009.
Net pension replacement rate for average earner men, (2005-2009). OECD 2005, OECD
2007, OECD 2009.
Net pension replacement rate for low earner men, (2005-2009). OECD 2005, OECD
2007, OECD 2009.
Net pension replacement rate for high earner men, (2005-2009). OECD 2005, OECD
2007, OECD 2009.
2. Outcome variables
Poverty and inequality
Gini coefficient for retirement age population after taxes and transfers (%). OECD 2010a.
Poverty rates for retirement age group, mid-2000s. OECD 2008.
Risk of relative poverty rate of men age (66-75), mid-2000s. OECD 2008.
Risk of relative poverty rate of men age (above 65), mid-2000s. OECD 2008.
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Risk of relative poverty rate of men age (above 75), mid-2000s. OECD 2008.
Gender inequality
Gender gap in old-age poverty (66-75), mid-2000s. OECD 2009.
Gender gap in old-age poverty (above 65), mid-2000s. OECD 2009.
Gender gap in old-age poverty (above 75), mid-2000s. OECD 2009.

Table 2.A.1.
Factor Loadings for Institutional Pension Characteristics
Variables
1
Old-age expenditure in % of GDP
Government spending on old-age
Labour force participation rate for men 65+
Official retirement age for men
Pension level for men
Pension wealth for men
Net pension replacement rate for average earner men
Net pension replacement rate for low earner men
Net pension replacement rate for high earner men

Factors
2

3

0.883
0.927
0.819
0.704
0.921
0.862
0.885
0.889
0.885
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Table 2.A.2.
Cluster Membership for Women According to Institutional Pension
Characteristics
Liberal
Australia
Belgium
Canada
Germany (a)
Ireland
New Zealand
Switzerland (a)
UK
US

Social
Democratic
Denmark
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
Sweden

Continental
European
Austria (a)
France
Germany (b)
Italy
Switzerland (b)

Southern
European
Austria (b)
Greece
Turkey

Notes: a) Hierarchical cluster analysis
b) k-means cluster analysis
This table is comparable with Table 2.1.

Table 2.A.3.
Distances between Final Cluster Centres by Institutional Pension
Characteristics
Cluster

Liberal

Liberal

Social
Democratic

Continental
European

Southern
European

3.85

3.36

6.04

2.59

3.08

Social Democratic

3.85

Continental European

3.36

2.59

Southern European

6.04

3.08

3.81
3.81

Note: The final cluster centres reflect the features of the typical country for each cluster. The greater
Euclidean distances between clusters correspond to greater distinctions.
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Table 2.A.4.
Institutional Variables for Men
GDP
Old-age
expend.
(%)

Govern.
Spending
Old-age

LFP
65
(Men)

Official
Retirement
Age (Men)

Pension
Level
(Men)

Pension
Wealth
(Men)

NPR for
Average
Earner
(Men)

NPR for
Low
Earner
(Men)

NPR for
High
Earner
(Men)

4.5
12.7
7.2
3.8
7.2
10.7
11.2
10.5
2.9

12.9
24.9
14.0
10.6
13.3
20.1
23.7
23.7
8.6

12.3
5.8
2.6
12.6
8.8
1.9
5.1
7.1
15.0

65
65
60
65
65
60
65
58
65

41.2
72.6
37.2
41.2
67.3
51.3
40.0
90.6
32.4

7.3
11.0
6.2
6.8
11.0
9.3
7.1
13.6
6.4

54.0
91.5
63.3
57.5
77.4
65.9
63.7
106.9
38.4

80.2
90.7
79.6
89.2
121.8
84.2
58.1
109.0
65.7

38.0
70.2
41.5
30.8
61.8
57.4
51.9
103.7
23.3

11.5
5.5

23.9
11.9

6.1
7.2

57
65

71.4
79.6

10.3
13.9

80.5
94.7

82.0
94.8

82.4
91.4

4.3

11.0

17.9

65

38.7

7.4

40.8

79.3

22.7

8.5
18.5
7.9
20.5
Spain
9.7
17.4
Sweden
6.7
18.6
Switzerland
6.4
16.7
Turkey
6.0
15.2
UK
5.3
14.6
US
Sources: OECD 2005, 2007, 2009.

24.5
3.0
14.6
12.5
22.2
9.8
20.2

65
65
65
65
60
65
65.8

59.8
74.7
68.5
49.5
79.9
32.0
37.9

9.0
11.5
10.8
8.8
10.2
4.9
5.6

72.9
59.2
65.4
65.4
110.7
43.2
49.4

90.2
84.3
83.6
71.7
111.8
69.4
62.2

77.5
76.0
78.0
36.6
107.7
25.5
38.5

Country

Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
NZ
Portugal
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Table 2.A.5.
Institutional Variables for Women
GDP
Old-age
expend.
(%)

Govern.
Spending
Old-age

LFP 65
(Women)

Official
Retirement
Age
(Women)

Pension
Level
(Women)

Pension
Wealth
(Women)

NPR for
Average
Earner
(Women)

NPR for
Low
Earner
(Women)

NPR for
High
Earner
(Women)

Australia

4.5

12.9

4.5

63

41.2

8.5

54.0

80.2

38.0

Austria

12.7

24.9

2.3

60

72.9

13.0

88.6

89.0

67.9

Belgium

7.2

14

0.9

60

37.3

7.2

63.3

79.6

41.5

Canada

3.8

10.6

5.4

65

41.2

7.9

57.5

89.2

30.8

Denmark

7.2

13.3

2.6

65

67.4

12.6

77.4

121.8

61.8

France

10.7

20.1

0.9

60

51.4

10.8

65.9

84.2

57.4

Germany

11.2

23.7

2.2

65

40.1

8.5

63.7

58.1

51.9

Greece

10.5

23.7

2.1

58

90.9

15.8

106.9

109.0

103.7

Ireland

2.9

8.6

3.8

65

32.4

7.6

38.4

65.7

23.3

Italy

11.5

23.9

1.2

57

61.5

11.6

70.1

76.5

71.9

Netherlands

5.5

11.9

2.1

65

79.9

16.3

94.7

94.8

91.4

NZ

4.3

11

8.9

65

38.7

8.6

40.8

79.3

22.7

Portugal

8.5

18.5

13.2

65

59.9

10.5

72.9

90.2

77.5

Spain

7.9

20.5

1.2

65

75.0

13.5

59.2

84.3

76.0

Sweden

9.7

17.4

7.0

65

68.6

12.2

65.4

83.6

78.0

Switzerland

6.7

18.6

5.5

64

50.0

10.8

66.8

72.0

37.0

Turkey

6.4

16.7

6.9

58

80.1

12.0

109.9

111.1

107.0

6
15.2
UK
5.3
14.6
US
Sources: OECD 2005, 2007, 2009.

4.4
12.0

60
65.8

32.0
38.0

5.6
6.5

43.2
49.4

69.4
62.2

25.5
38.5

Country
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Table 2.A.6.
Outcome Variables for Men

Country

GINI
coefficient
for
Retirees

Poverty
Rates for
Retirees

Risk of
Poverty
66-75
(Men)

Risk of
Poverty
65+
(Men)

Risk of
Poverty
75+
(Men)

Gender
Gap in
Old-age
(66-75)

Gender
Gap in
Old-age
(65+)

Gender
Gap in
Old-age
(75+)

Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
France
Germany
Greece

0.300
0.280
0.240
0.270
0.200
0.310
0.270
0.330

0.27
0.07
0.13
0.06
0.10
0.09
0.09
0.23

0.25
0.03
0.11
0.03
0.06
0.06
0.04
0.15

0.49
0.08
0.27
0.06
0.17
0.13
0.11
0.44

0.24
0.05
0.16
0.03
0.12
0.07
0.07
0.29

Ireland
Italy

0.280
0.310

0.31
0.13

0.22
0.08

0.51
0.16

0.29
0.08

Netherlands
NZ

0.240
0.230

0.02
0.02

0.02
0.02

0.03
0.04

0.02
0.02

0.17
0.23
0.06
0.18
0.15
0.10
0.24

0.14
0.17
0.04
0.14
0.14
0.07
0.17

0.34
0.42
0.09
0.31
0.31
0.15
0.37

0.20
0.25
0.05
0.17
0.17
0.08
0.20

2.39
4.97
-0.42
3.80
2.63
1.74
4.12
7.80
7.40
5.40
0.70
-1.50
1.13
5.80
-0.26
4.40
2.55
3.22
5.87

4.34
6.54
0.17
5.00
3.52
3.78
5.73
4.15
10.70
7.96
0.66
-1.25
1.02
4.61
3.49
4.10
1.04
5.21
8.33

7.05
7.61
0.02
6.54
3.20
5.66
6.92
-1.92
13.65
11.30
0.65
-0.90
0.09
1.90
7.06
3.43
-3.85
7.00
11.78

0.380
Portugal
0.310
Spain
0.220
Sweden
0.280
Switzerland
0.370
Turkey
0.270
UK
0.400
US
Sources: OECD 2005, 2007, 2009.
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Table 2.A.7.
Outcome Variables for Women

Country

GINI
coefficient
for
Retirees

Poverty
Rates for
Retirees

0.300
0.27
Australia
0.280
0.07
Austria
0.240
0.13
Belgium
0.270
0.06
Canada
0.200
0.10
Denmark
0.310
0.09
France
0.270
0.09
Germany
0.330
0.23
Greece
0.280
0.31
Ireland
0.310
0.13
Italy
0.240
0.02
Netherlands
0.230
0.02
NZ
0.380
0.17
Portugal
0.310
0.23
Spain
0.220
0.06
Sweden
0.280
0.18
Switzerland
0.370
0.15
Turkey
0.270
0.10
UK
0.400
0.24
US
Sources: OECD 2005, 2007, 2009.

Risk of
Poverty
66-75
(Women)

Risk of
Poverty
65+
(Women)

Risk of
Poverty
75+
(Women)

Gender
Gap in
Old-age
(66-75)

Gender
Gap in
Old-age
(65+)

Gender
Gap in
Old-age
(75+)

0.27
0.08
0.10
0.07
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.23
0.29
0.14
0.03
0.01
0.15
0.23
0.03
0.19
0.16
0.10
0.23

0.58
0.21
0.26
0.16
0.23
0.21
0.21
0.50
0.72
0.33
0.05
0.02
0.35
0.50
0.15
0.40
0.30
0.25
0.55

0.31
0.13
0.16
0.09
0.15
0.13
0.13
0.27
0.43
0.19
0.02
0.01
0.20
0.27
0.12
0.21
0.14
0.15
0.32

2.39
4.97
-0.42
3.80
2.63
1.74
4.12
7.80
7.40
5.40
0.70
-1.50
1.13
5.80
-0.26
4.40
2.55
3.22
5.87

4.34
6.54
0.17
5.00
3.52
3.78
5.73
4.15
10.70
7.96
0.66
-1.25
1.02
4.61
3.49
4.10
1.04
5.21
8.33

7.05
7.61
0.02
6.54
3.20
5.66
6.92
-1.92
13.65
11.30
0.65
-0.90
0.09
1.90
7.06
3.43
-3.85
7.00
11.78
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CHAPTER 3
WELFARE REGIMES FOR AGEING POPULATIONS: NO SINGLE
PATH FOR REFORM1

Demographic changes and their consequences for labour force participation rates are
closely related to the formation and functioning of the welfare state. The welfare state, as
we know it today, gradually emerged in the course of the twentieth century. For the first
time in history, the modern state assumed substantial responsibility for addressing such
problems as poverty, disability, and senescence. It sought to cope with social problems
and risks that were previously managed by families, kin, and charities. Achieving higher
living standards for its citizens has become the main responsibility of the state. Pensions
and health services are integral parts of these welfare policies. In the early post World
War II period, rapid economic growth rates and the rising numbers of young workers
made it possible to accomplish the goals of the welfare state regarding the living
standards of the elderly. Generous retirement benefits and increasing health costs are
difficult for an ageing society to sustain, however.
The world population and especially the populations of industrialized countries
are rapidly growing older, as a result of declines in mortality and fertility. In the regions
the United Nations currently classifies as more developed, the ratio of the population

1

This chapter has been published in Population and Development Review, 35(4), pp. 701-720, in 2009.
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aged 65+ to those aged 15–64 is projected to increase from 13 per 100 in 1960 to 40 per
100 in 2040 (UN 2008). Longer life and better health have not been accompanied by later
ages at retirement. Before the development of welfare states, people generally worked
until poor health disabled them. With the emergence of the welfare state, labour force
participation rates for people aged 55 and over began to decline starting in the 1940s
(Myles 1984). With the institutionalization of the welfare state and more generous social
pension plans, the trend toward earlier retirement has compounded the fiscal costs of
ageing (OECD 1998: 42).
A number of countries developed public pension programs before World War I,
but the full introduction of comprehensive and universal social security took place after
World War II (Pierson 1991). We can separate the “first comers” in Continental and
Social Democratic countries from the “late comers” in Southern Europe and Liberal
countries. (“Liberal,” here and subsequently, is understood in its classical economic sense
of market based.) In the twentieth century, especially after World War II, risks that affect
an individual’s life were considered as social, that is, a matter of state concern. In the
second half of the twentieth century, studies in political economy developed various
welfare state typologies (Titmuss 1974). Since the early 1990s, that literature has been
dominated by the widespread debate surrounding Esping-Andersen’s (1990) influential
analysis of three types of welfare regimes—Liberal, Social Democratic, and
Conservative. Several authors have added a fourth type of welfare state regime—
Southern European (Mediterranean, Latin Rim)—to Esping-Andersen’s classification
(Leibfried 1992; Ferrera 1996; Bonoli 1997; Korpi and Palme 1998; Gough 2000;
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Mingione 2001). This addition seems appropriate to us, given the continuing strong role
of the family and the lower levels of welfare services in the Southern European countries.
In this study, a classification into Liberal, Social Democratic, Continental, and
Southern European welfare regimes will be used in analyzing labour market
characteristics, including labour force participation by age and sex, along with social
security policies, including pension policies. At the same time, countries in all regime
categories are undergoing similar demographic trends, especially population ageing. This
demographic transformation has made pension reform necessary, particularly as the large
baby boom cohorts begin to exit the labour market (Bongaarts 2004).
While the challenges are similar across industrialized countries, policy responses
vary. The main purpose of this chapter is to evaluate labour force participation of older
persons and recent retirement policies in various welfare regime settings. Even though
population ageing and retirement policies have similar characteristics across countries,
different welfare regimes respond differently. By comparing sets of OECD countries, this
chapter seeks to determine the extent to which pension reform follows a path associated
with a particular welfare regime. That is, to what extent do the various types of welfare
states adjust to the new challenges in ways that correspond with past institutional
arrangements (Esping-Andersen 1999; Pierson 2001; Castles 2004)? We first discuss the
reasons for significant changes in pensioner–worker ratios in light of population ageing
and the early retirement policies promulgated during the 1970s and 1980s. We then
analyze the welfare regimes of various OECD countries, their pension and employment
strategies, and their pension reform trends.
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3.1. Understanding the Recent Problem
3.1.1. Demography of Ageing
The patterns of population change can largely be summarized in terms of demographic
transition theory. The substantial declines in mortality and fertility have resulted in a
gradual increase in the ratio of older to younger people in the population. The decline in
fertility brought “ageing at the bottom,” with smaller numbers of young people (Caldwell
and Schindlmayr 2003; McDonald 2006). Especially since the 1970s, the mortality
improvements at adult and older ages have contributed to population ageing (Legare
2001; Beaujot and Kerr 2004: 47; Bongaarts 2006). The age structure of many countries
is also affected by the postwar baby boom. As the baby boom generation passes through
various ages, it affects the relative size of the corresponding age group (Foot 1996; Cork
1997). Starting in the second decade of the twenty-first century, it will bring an increase
in the proportion of the population aged 65 and older.
These demographic trends are largely similar across OECD countries. Table 3.1
shows life expectancy at birth, total fertility rates, and percent of population aged 65 and
older for countries in each of the four welfare regimes. In 1950-55, life expectancy was
highest in the Social Democratic countries, followed by the Liberal countries, and lowest
in the countries of Southern Europe. The differences were small in 1950-55, and they
have since narrowed further. In 1950-55, the Liberal countries such as Canada, New
Zealand, and the United States had higher fertility rates than other countries, while in
2010-15 the Liberal and Social Democratic countries are expected to have the highest
fertility. The fertility trend is downward in each region over the periods indicated, with
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the exception of the Social Democratic countries where there is an increase between 1980
and 2010. Fertility is particularly low in Southern Europe although it is lowest in the
largest European country, Germany, which is part of the Continental group.
In 1980, the countries with the highest proportion of the population aged 65+
were the Scandinavian and Continental European countries such as Sweden, Germany,
Austria, and Norway. While all the trends are toward population ageing, significant
differences are expected to emerge—ranging, in 2040, from an average of 22.2 percent
aged 65 and older in the Liberal countries to 29.4 percent in Southern Europe. The
marked fertility decline has produced more ageing in Southern European and Continental
European countries, while the slight increases in fertility in the Social Democratic group
and the higher fertility in the Liberal group have resulted in less ageing.
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Table 3.1.
Life Expectancy, Total Fertility, and Proportions Aged 65+ by Sex in Selected
OECD Countries Representative
Country

Sex

Life expectancy at birth

Total fertility rate

Percentage of population aged
65+

19501955

19801985

20102015

20402045

19501955

19801985

20102015

20402045

1950

Males
Females

69.6
72.4

71.6
77.6

76.7
81.4

80.2
84.8

2.55

1.43

1.85

1.85

9.1

14.4

16.7

24.7

Males
Females

63.2
69.6

70.0
77.9

77.2
83.6

81
87

3.0

1.69

1.85

1.85

6.7

12

17.2

25.5

Males

70.9

72.9

79.2

82.7

Females

74.5

79.5

83.4

86.8

2.6

1.69

1.86

1.85

9.7

14.8

15.0

23.4

Males
Females

70.4
73.3

73.5
79.5

79.6
83.6

83
86.5

2.21

1.65

1.85

1.85

10.3

16.3

18.3

24.1

S.D.
Average

Males
Females

68.5
72.5

72
78.6

78.2
83

81.7
86.3

2.59

1.62

1.85

1.85

9.0

14.4

16.8

24.4

Austria

Males
Females

63.6
68.8

69.4
76.6

78.2
83.2

82.2
86.6

2.08

1.59

1.41

1.71

10.4

15.4

17.6

28.5

Males
Females

64.1
69.9

70.6
78.8

78.6
85.1

82.6
88.3

2.73

1.81

1.85

1.85

11.4

14.0

17.0

26.5

Males
Females

65.3
69.6

70.3
76.8

77.8
83.1

81.3
86.5

2.16

1.46

1.34

1.64

9.7

15.6

20.5

31.8

Males
Females

70.9
73.4

72.8
79.5

78.5
82.6

81.9
85.6

3.06

1.52

1.77

1.85

7.7

11.5

15.4

26.3

C.E.
Average

Males
Females

66.0
70.4

70.8
77.9

78.3
83.5

82
86.8

2.51

1.60

1.59

1.76

9.8

14.1

17.6

28.3

Greece

Males
Females

64.3
67.5

72.8
77.5

77.7
82.5

81.2
86.1

2.29

1.96

1.41

1.71

6.8

13.1

18.3

28.3

Males
Females

64.4
68.1

71.4
78

78.6
84.6

82
87.9

2.36

1.54

1.41

1.69

8.1

13.5

20.4

31.8

Males
Females

61.6
66.3

72.8
79.2

78.6
84.7

82.6
87.6

2.57

1.89

1.56

1.85

7.3

11.2

17.2

28.1

Males

63.4

72.3

78.3

81.9

Females

67.3

78.2

83.9

87.2

2.41

1.80

1.46

1.75

7.6

12.6

18.6

29.4

Denmark
Finland
Norway
Sweden

France
Germany
Netherlands

Italy
Spain
S.E.
Average

1980 2010
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Table 3.1.
Life Expectancy, Total Fertility, and Proportions Aged 65+ by Sex in Selected OECD Countries
Representative (cont.)
Country

Canada
Ireland
New
Zealand
UK
US
Liberal
Average

Sex

Life expectancy at birth

Total fertility rate

Percentage of population aged
65+

19501955

19801985

20102015

20402045

19501955

19801985

20102015

20402045

1950

1980

2010

2040

Males
Females

66.8
71.7

72.5
79.5

79.2
83.6

82.6
86.9

3.65

1.63

1.62

1.85

7.7

9.4

14.1

24.5

Males
Females

65.7
68.2

70.4
75.9

78.1
82.9

81.6
86.4

3.38

2.88

1.92

1.85

10.7

10.7

11.4

20.3

Males
Females

67.5
71.8

70.6
76.7

79.1
82.8

83
86.3

3.69

1.97

2.02

1.85

9.0

9.8

13.0

22.5

Males
Females

66.7
71.8

71.2
77.2

77.8
82.3

81.3
85.8

2.18

1.8

1.85

1.85

10.7

14.9

16.6

22.6

Males
Females

66.1
72.0

70.8
77.9

77.7
82.1

80.4
85.3

3.45

1.83

2.02

1.85

8.3

11.2

13.0

21.0

Males

66.6

71.1

78.4

81.8

3.27
2.02
1.89
1.85
9.3
11.2
13.6
Females
71.0
77.4
82.7
86.1
Notes: Averages are shown for the four welfare regime types based on the countries shown in the table:

22.2

Social Democratic (S.D.), Continental European (C.E.), Southern European (S.E.), and Liberal countries.
Following the usual practice cluster averages are unweighted. The data presented are from the medium
variant of world population prospects data.
Source: UN 2008, <<http://esa.un.org/unpp>>.

According to UN projections, Italy and Germany will have the oldest populations in
Europe with about 32 percent of their population aged 65 and older in 2040. The overall
ageing trend is seen in the average for OECD countries, which shows the proportion aged
65 and older rising from 7.8 percent of the total population in 1950 to 10.8 percent in
1980, 14.7 percent in 2010, and 23.9 percent in 2040 (OECD 2007d).
Levels of international migration complete this demographic picture. In the 1950s,
all but the Liberal cluster show net outflow, but this is reversed and all clusters show net
42

inflow by 1980. Other than Spain, the European regions are similar in 2005, with net inmigration of some 2.5 persons per 1000 population (UN 2008). Net immigration has
increased the most in the Liberal countries, with an average level of 5.8 per 1000
population in 2005 (UN 2008).
3.1.2. Labour Market and Retirement
The significance of population ageing for welfare expenditures is affected by changing
labour force participation. Especially in the second half of the twentieth century, the
labour market underwent rapid changes, associated particularly with women’s higher
participation. At ages 25–54, men’s labour force participation rates in the selected
countries in 2005 are uniformly high, but women’s rates range from an average of 85
percent for the Scandinavian region to 65 percent in Southern Europe (OECD 2007a). At
ages 15–24, women’s rates are highest in the Liberal and Social Democratic welfare
states, while men’s rates are highest in the Liberal group, followed by Social Democratic
and Continental countries, and lowest for Southern Europe.
Table 3.2 presents labour force participation rates for men and women in the age
group 55–64 for countries in the four welfare regimes. The declining labour force
participation of older men in many industrialized countries is one of the most prominent
economic trends of the period between 1970 and 2000. While the OECD average labour
force participation rate for ages 55–64 was 78.6 percent for males in 1970, it fell to 62.7
percent by 2000. Male rates in all welfare regimes subsequently increased between 2000
and 2005. Even though women’s participation at ages 55–64 has increased from 37.2
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percent in 1970 to 43.8 percent by 2005, this rise has not compensated for the longer term
decline in men’s rates at these ages.

Table 3.2.
Labour force participation rates (in percent) at ages 55–64 by sex in selected OECD countries
representative of four welfare regimes, 1970–2005
Country

Males

Females

1970
1980
1990
2000
2005
1970
1980
1990
69.1
64.5
70.2
45.9
Denmark
73.9
56.9
47.1
48.1
56.5
45.2
43.8
40.8
Finland
79.5
72.8
74.4
74.6
49.8
53.9
Norway
85.4
78.6
75.5
72.8
76.4
44.5
55.3
65.8
Sweden
S.D. Average
79.6
71.7
66.1
65.0
69.4
44.8
49.6
51.6
42.8
43.0
Austria
75.4
68.6
45.8
41.7
43.9
40.0
40.1
31.1
France
80.2
67.3
60.5
52.4
61.3
28.5
28.9
27.8
Germany
63.2
45.7
50.8
58.0
14.4
16.7
Netherlands
C.E. Average
77.8
66.3
50.7
46.9
51.6
34.2
27.8
25.2
59.5
57.3
60.7
24.3
Greece
48.2
39.6
53.0
42.7
44.3
10.6
11.0
15.5
Italy
75.9
62.5
60.5
63.2
21.0
19.4
Spain
S.E. Average
48.2
57.8
58.3
53.5
56.1
10.6
16.0
19.7
74.5
64.0
60.7
66.7
32.6
34.9
Canada
65.0
64.7
67.7
19.9
Ireland
56.8
72.2
79.7
30.7
New Zealand
68.1
63.3
67.9
38.7
UK
83.0
72.1
67.8
67.3
69.3
43.0
41.3
45.2
US
Liberal Average
83.0
73.3
64.4
65.6
70.3
43.0
37.0
33.9
OECD total
78.6
72.6
65.6
62.7
65.6
37.2
37.0
36.2
Notes: Averages are shown for the four welfare regime types based on the countries shown in the table:
Social Democratic (S.D.), Continental European (C.E.), Southern European (S.E.), and Liberal
countries. Following the usual practice cluster averages are unweighted. OECD total covers all
OECD countries.

2000
48.2
45.2
61.6
65.9
55.3
17.6
33.0
33.5
26.0
27.5
25.5
16.1
22.6
21.4
41.4
27.8
47.9
42.5
51.9
42.3
38.7

Source: OECD 2009, http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx.

Analyses have shown that public pension systems and generous benefits for the
unemployed tend to reduce labour force participation at older ages in many OECD
countries (Duval 2003). In the last three decades of the twentieth century, many people
retired before they qualified for standard pensions. Some of these pathways to retirement
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2005
55.7
56.4
62.9
69.2
61.1
23.6
37.9
43.2
36.0
35.2
26.9
21.5
29.6
26.0
49.4
38.4
62.5
48.9
57.0
51.3
43.8

were paved by social transfer programs such as disability, unemployment, and early
retirement schemes. Some countries such as France and New Zealand reduced the
standard age of eligibility for pension benefits in the 1970s and 1980s. When people
reach the standard or early retirement age, their retirement decisions will depend not only
on the level of pensions in comparison to employment income, but also on the expected
gain from staying in the labour force in comparison to withdrawing from work. If
working longer is compensated by a rise in future pension benefits or if early retirement
benefits are not seen to be sufficiently high, people are more likely to stay in the labour
force (OECD 2004b). In many OECD countries, however, public policies have prompted
a significant number of people to retire as soon as they reach the age of pension
entitlement. In their comparative study, Gruber and Wise (1999) show that many
industrialized countries have strong social security incentives for people to retire early.
Labour force participation at ages 55–64 shows marked differences across the
four welfare regimes. It is lowest in Southern Europe, partly because of women’s low
labour force participation. In 1990 in the three representative countries only 19.7 percent
of women aged 55–64 were in the labour force, and low female participation continued in
the early twenty-first century. Women’s participation rates are also low in Continental
Europe, with a low point of 25.2 percent of women aged 55–64 in the labour force in
1990, rising to 35.2 percent in 2005. Female participation rates were higher in the other
two clusters, reaching 51.3 percent in the Liberal countries and 61.1 percent in the Social
Democratic countries by 2005.
The labour force participation rate of men in the 55–64 age group also shows
distinct differences among welfare regime clusters. Social Democratic and Liberal
45

countries have generally higher male participation rates; Continental Europe and
Southern Europe have relatively low rates. These differences across welfare regimes
reflect not only policies toward early retirement, but also broader labour market and
social policies. The high rates at ages 55–64 in the Social Democratic group reflect a
need for extensive labour force participation to fund generous social benefits. The high
rates in the Liberal countries follow from their less generous pension policies, especially
for those taking early retirement. The low rates in Southern Europe reflect the
expectations placed on families for old-age security, and thus on women playing
caretaking rather than labour force roles.
3.2. Different Regimes, Similar Policies?
The study of pension reforms in the different welfare regimes is useful in understanding
the diversity of experiences between countries. It helps to determine whether certain
welfare states are really being dismantled and whether the Liberal group’s approach has
become dominant in recent decades. In studying the characteristics of pension policies
and their changes, we discuss both the management of social risks in ageing societies and
the policy profile of pension reforms.
Different welfare regime types represent different responsibilities assumed by the
market, the state, and the family in the management of social risks and social security
(see Table 3.3). The Liberal welfare regime is distinguished by the dominant role of the
market in the management of social risks with lower responsibility on the part of the state
and the family. In the welfare states of the Social Democratic regime, the state plays a
larger role than the market and the family in meeting the social needs of citizens. While
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all of the these actors play a moderate role in the management of social risks in the
Continental European group, the family remains the key actor in the Southern European
group.
The extent to which welfare regimes are stable and path dependent is under
debate (Taylor-Gooby 1998; Rein and Schmähl 2004). A pattern of path dependency
occurs when institutions and programs, once established, become difficult to reverse
(Pierson 1996, 2001; Myles and Pierson 2001; Wood 2001). Consequently, the
transformation of welfare regimes is largely a product of earlier institutionalized features,
and changes are constrained by existing institutional arrangements (Myles and Pierson
2001). Pierson’s (2001) conceptualization focuses on welfare state restructuring along
three dimensions: cost containment, recalibration, and re-commodification (see Table
3.3).
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Table 3.3.
Characteristics of pension reforms within four welfare regimes: Relative priority of
components of social risk management and pension reform agenda
Social democratic
Management of social risk

Continental Europe

Southern Europe

Liberal

Relative Priority

State

High

Moderate

Moderate

Low

Family

Low

Moderate

High

Low

Market

Low

Moderate

Moderate

High

High

High

Moderate

Moderate

Moderate

Moderate

High

Low

Low

Moderate

Moderate

High

Pension Reform Agenda
Cost containment
Recalibration
Re-commodification

Notes: Cost containment: reforms that mostly seek to balance budgets and maintain the existing system.
Recalibration: reforms that change regulations to reduce inefficiency or to update pension systems
following on evolving conditions. Re-commodification: reforms that increase the individual’s
dependence on the market for social security.

These dimensions are useful in evaluating recent pension reforms and the transformation
of the welfare state. According to Esping-Andersen (1990), as markets became
hegemonic the welfare of an individual began to depend entirely on the cash economy,
and maintaining a livelihood without relying on the market became almost impossible.
This is called the commodification of the individual. De-commodification “occurs when a
service is rendered as a matter of right, and when a person can maintain a livelihood
without reliance on the market” (Esping-Andersen 1990: 21–22). Re commodification, on
the other hand, is one of the most significant aspects of welfare state transformation,
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namely the effort to reverse dependence on the state through tightening eligibility or
cutting benefits (Pierson 2001: 422). Re-commodification is therefore concerned with
dismantling some aspects of the welfare state that protect individuals from market
pressures. Many welfare states experience budgetary constraints, often a response to
concerns that pension policies are not sustainable. Cost containment responds to
pressures on government budgets and seeks reforms associated with government
expenditures (ibid.: 424). Unlike re-commodification, these policy initiatives focus on
deficit reduction and cost containment to maintain the existing system. By recalibration,
Pierson (ibid.: 425) means welfare reforms through the removal of inefficient regulations.
Recalibration consists of two kinds of change: rationalization (modification of social
policies in line with new ideas for achieving welfare targets) and updating (adapting
social programs to changes in the economy and society) (ibid.: 425). As indicated in
Table 3.3, we propose that cost containment has been more central to the retirement
policies of Social Democratic countries and Continental Europe, while Liberal welfare
states focus mainly on increasing the role of the individual in the market (recommodification), and Southern European welfare states focus on changing regulations
(recalibration). In order to determine whether there is a dismantlement of welfare states
or a pattern of path dependency, we need to scrutinize recent pension reforms in each
welfare regime cluster in light of the categories in Table 3.3.
3.2.1. The Liberal Regime
The Liberal welfare regime (Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and United
States) is distinguished by the dominant role of the market in the management of social
risks and by the modest extent and scale of universal transfers, modest social insurance
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plans, and means-tested social assistance. In this regime, social welfare arrangements
have been severely circumscribed by norms of Liberal work ethics, which limit welfare
provision to marginal groups such as single mothers, the disabled, the elderly, and the
poor (Esping-Andersen 1999: 40). There is an emphasis on local communities (churches,
charities, private agencies) and on the market to provide for the welfare of the individual
(ibid.: 33). As compared with the Continental and Southern European welfare regimes,
women have higher participation rates in the labour market. Compared to the averages for
the other regions, we find less population ageing in the countries following the Liberal
model, along with relatively high labour force participation of both sexes at ages 55–64
and older retirement ages (Table 3.2). These countries lack egalitarian provisions, and
average wages are lower than in other welfare regimes (ibid.). The problems of budget
deficits and unemployment are largely avoided through policies that support the
expansion of low-wage private-sector employment.
In the Liberal welfare states, pension reforms have focused on cost containment
and re-commodification, which follow central aspects of the institutional structure of this
regime (Pierson 2001). Many countries in this group have reduced social transfers in the
last two decades. Reforms have concentrated on targeting pension systems to persons in
need and finding measures to increase the coverage of private pensions through tax
incentives. These countries are preceding other countries in retirement benefit
privatization to reduce long-term pension expenditure. Employees are encouraged to opt
for private pension plans, with government support through tax exemptions. In the United
Kingdom in the late 1980s, workers were permitted to select private pension plans
according to their needs and contributions. While 42 percent of all households in the
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United States owned Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs), 40 percent of workers in
Canada were covered by Registered Pension Plans (OECD 2005b: 80; OECD 2005a: 74).
Although the public pension system is the basic source of income for retirees in many
OECD countries, employer-provided pension plans are becoming important sources of
retirement income especially for the upper middle class. Analyses by the OECD (2000,
2004b, 2005a, 2005b) reveal that recent reforms in Liberal countries have strengthened
the financial sustainability of old-age pensions, and these reforms have been more
successful than those in other countries.
As shown in Table 3.4, public social expenditures and public old-age
expenditures in the Liberal countries have been relatively low compared to expenditures
in other welfare states, and these expenditures are predicted to remain relatively small in
2050 (OECD 2005b). Compared to other regions, the net replacement rate of public
pensions represents an average of only 46 percent of former earnings (see Table 3.4 for
definition of net replacement). Moreover, similar to reforms in other welfare regimes,
these countries have also increased the age at retirement. The full pension age increased
from 65 to 67 years in the United States, and the pension age increased from 60 to 65 in
New Zealand. In the United Kingdom the pension age for women and eligibility for
guaranteed credit increased from 60 to 65 years in 2004. Some differences in cost
containment and re-commodification of pension policies over time are found across
countries in the Liberal welfare regime. For example, the relative low income rate, which
measures the proportion of persons below half of the median family income in each
country, is only 5.4 percent for Canadian seniors, compared to 24.7 percent in the US in
the late 1990s (Picot and Myles 2005: 12). Even though there have been some variations
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in retirement policies and pension reforms among Liberal countries, there has been no
convergence by Liberal countries toward other welfare regimes (Myles and Pierson
2001). These countries have followed their traditional path.
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Table 3.4.
Total public expenditure and public pension expenditure as a
percent of GDP, net replacement rates, and average effective age of retirement
in selected OECD countries representative of four welfare regimes
Country

Denmark

Total public social
Public pension
Net replacement
expenditure in
expenditure in
rate at average
percentage of GDP percentage of GDP earnings (2007) in
(2001) i
(2001) ii
percent iii
29.2
24.8
23.9
28.9

6.5
8.0
4.8
7.4

87
71
69
64

Average effective
age of retirement
(2005)
Males

Females

64.1
60.5
63.9
65.5

61.4
60.1
62.2
62.5

Finland
Norway
Sweden
S.D. Average
26.7
6.7
73
63.5
61.6
26.0
12.9
91
59.1
58.1
Austria
28.5
11.9
63
58.5
59.2
France
27.4
11.2
40
61.7
60.7
Germany
21.8
6.4
97
60.2
60.5
Netherlands
C.E. Average
25.9
10.6
73
59.9
59.6
24.3
13.4
110
62.4
61.2
Greece
24.4
13.8
78
60.4
60.9
Italy
19.6
8.7
85
61.1
63.4
Spain
S.E. Average
22.8
12.0
94
61.3
61.8
17.8
5.3
57
63.3
61.4
Canada
13.8
3.2
39
65.2
64.7
Ireland
18.5
4.9
42
65.8
63.9
New Zealand
21.8
8.3
41
63.2
61.4
UK
US iv
14.8
6.1
52
64.5
63.1
Liberal Average
17.3
5.5
46
64.4
62.9
Notes: Averages are shown for the four welfare regime types based on the countries shown in the table:
Social Democratic (S.D.), Continental European (C.E.), Southern European (S.E.), and Liberal
countries. Following the usual practice cluster averages are unweighted.
i: Total public social expenditure is the provision by public institutions of benefits to, and
financial contributions targeted at, households and individuals in order to provide support during
circumstances which adversely affect their welfare, provided that the provision of the benefits and
financial contributions constitutes neither a direct payment for a particular good or service nor an
individual contract or transfer.
ii: Public pension expenditure comprises all cash expenditures on old-age pensions within the
public sphere.
iii: The net replacement rate is defined as the individual net pension entitlement divided by net
pre-retirement earnings, taking account of personal income taxes and social security contributions
paid by workers and pensioners. The wedge between gross and net replacement rates varies
substantially across countries.
iv: Total public social expenditure and public pension expenditure for the US refer to federal
expenditures.
Sources: OECD 2007a; OECD 2007b; OECD 2007c.
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Increasing health costs for an ageing society and quality of health care have become
major policy concerns in Canada and the United Kingdom. Pension eligibility has been
tightened and benefits have been reduced in the United States. In Canada, the
contribution rates to public pensions were increased. We conclude that in the Liberal
group re-commodification, or increasing the individual’s dependence on the market for
old-age security, constitutes the main goal of recent pension reforms, while cost
containment is another significant goal.
3.2.2. The Social Democratic Regime
In the welfare states of the Social Democratic regime (Denmark, Finland, Norway, and
Sweden), the state plays a larger role than the market and the family in meeting its
citizens’ social needs. State-centered welfare provisions lessen the individual’s reliance
on the family and maximize individual command of economic resources independent of
familial reciprocities (Esping-Andersen 1999: 45). Welfare state provisions, therefore,
make it easier for women to enter the labour market and to achieve economic
independence. This regime also aims to harmonize women’s employment with
childbearing (ibid.: 27). In part because of family-friendly institutional arrangements, the
Scandinavian countries have higher fertility than other European countries, and thus
population ageing is slightly less than elsewhere. Labour force participation is relatively
high, as is age at retirement, partly as a function of active labour market programs and
life-long learning provisions. The official age at retirement is also relatively high, and the
net replacement rate of pension entitlements represents 73 percent of average former
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earnings (Table 3.4). Total public spending is 26.7 percent of GDP, but this spending is
not concentrated in pensions to the degree it is in Continental and Southern Europe.
In the Social Democratic regime, individuals are less dependent on the market for
old-age security, which is provided through universal and comprehensive welfare policies
to which all income earners must contribute. The cost of maintaining a universalistic
social support system is met through revenue from registered employees (EspingAndersen 1990: 28). This regime is also committed to full employment and to allowing
two-earner couples to reconcile their family and work responsibilities. It is more fully
committed to gender equality than other welfare regimes.
Even though some argue that Scandinavian countries are becoming the
“frontrunners in Liberalization” (Andersen et al. 2007), pension reforms in this regime
are more concerned about cost containment, with moderate recalibration and little recommodification (Pierson 2001; Vidlund 2006). The new pension system in Sweden, for
example, is a combination of an earnings-based pension and a minimum guaranteed
pension that seeks to minimize pension costs. Those pensions based on earnings have
adopted defined contributions both for the pay-as-you-go component and for the prefunded component (OECD 2003a: 47). Cost containment is thus met through high labour
force participation and defined-contribution approaches.
The reform agenda of Social Democratic countries has focused on rationalizing
programs, following on social and cultural changes and on global economic
developments. These countries have been relatively successful in restoring their fiscal
equilibrium over the medium term (Pierson 2001: 444). Their most pressing long-term
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problem is reconciling the need for continuing cost containment with the maintenance of
support for a strong welfare state. Social Democratic welfare states depend on successful
economic performance and the allegiance of all stratums of society.
Thus in the Social Democratic regime, the state has two main roles in managing
social risks: first, “de-familialization” to provide individual freedom; second, “decommodification” to minimize individuals’ welfare dependence on the market (EspingAndersen 1999, 2002). This approach can be seen in the pension regimes of Scandinavian
countries. The state provides generous pension plans and social security for its citizens
and emphasizes high labour force participation and cost containment of pension
obligations.
3.2.3. The Continental European Regime
The Continental European welfare regime (Austria, France, Germany, and Netherlands)
reflects a highly conservative and corporatist tradition heavily influenced by religious
institutions. The conservative tradition is seen in the emphasis on the preservation of
status differentials. Corporatist elements include the institutionalization of rights attached
to class and status rather than to citizenship (Esping-Andersen 1990). The social
insurance system, for example, is differentiated by occupational groups; even
unemployment benefits differ according to a recipient’s previous occupation. The
Continental welfare regime is sometimes criticized as being paternalistic, hierarchical,
and gender biased. Contrary to the Liberal welfare regime, the state plays a fairly active
role in the management of social risks. The state is considered mainly as minimally
interventionist, and the welfare provisions tend to uphold the stratification of society and
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the patriarchal family structure (Pierson 2001: 96). This gives rise to a focus on the male
workforce with high wages, strong job security, and high pension incomes combined with
the family’s dependence on the breadwinner’s income (Esping-Andersen 1996: 18). Men
have higher employment opportunities in the form of full life-time employment and an
entitlement to generous pension and unemployment rights. Relatively high wages and a
long unbroken career for males provide support for the moderate familialistic character of
the regime.
While not as extensive as in Southern Europe, population ageing is significant in
Continental Europe, with some countries anticipating population decline, and there are
relatively low overall labour force participation rates and a young age at retirement.
Countries in this regime cluster have a combination of generous pension schemes defined
by occupation or by civil service membership. Relatively high replacement rates and
diverse pension plans made early retirement popular. During the 1970s and 1980s, the
Continental regime countries opted to use an early retirement strategy to address the
problem of increasing unemployment. In Germany, for example, with the introduction of
an early retirement option in 1973, the average retirement age declined from 62.2 years in
1973 to 58.4 years in 1981 (OECD 2005d: 73). This trend toward early retirement has
been reversed by reforms in the 1990s and 2000s seeking to extend people’s working
lives (OECD 2005c). In Austria, the early retirement age was increased by 1.5 years, and
pension ages for women were aligned with those of men (OECD 2007b: 102). After
pension reform in Germany, some reductions in benefits were imposed on workers who
retired before age 65. In France, however, one can retire at age 60 after 40 years’
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coverage without any reduction in benefits (OECD 2005c). Overall, there are fewer
regulations regarding retirement age than in Southern European countries.
The main goal of pension reforms in Continental European countries is to
minimize financial costs in an ageing population through adjusting contribution rates and
pension benefits. France, for example, changed to using the 25 highest income years of a
person’s work life, instead of the ten highest years, in the calculation of pension benefits
(OECD 2007b). Austria is gradually extending its benefits-averaging period from the 15
highest to the 40 highest income years. In the Netherlands, the calculation of pension
benefits in many occupational plans is shifting from final salary to average lifetime salary
(OECD 2007b: 55). These conservative welfare states face significant problems
associated with high unemployment rates, low economic growth rates, low levels of
female work force participation, relatively low fertility rates, and high pension
expenditures. According to Pierson (2001), reforms have centered especially on cost
containment and recalibration of welfare policies to meet these challenges. Nevertheless,
the introduction of a new private pension tier in Continental Europe is a clear example of
increasing the individual’s dependence on the market (re-commodification). Hence, the
role of state and family in managing social risks for the elderly population is shared by
the market.
Employment-linked social security, which protects life-long employment in these
conservative countries, is one of the main characteristics of the Continental European
welfare regime. Thus, there is strong social opposition to changes in employment
structures and to reneging on the promise of full employment (Pierson 2001; Natali and
Rhodes 2004). The situation in this regime cluster differs from that of the Liberal and
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Social Democratic welfare states, where there is less recognition of specific class
interests, especially those associated with the middle class (Korpi and Palme 2003).
3.2.4. The Southern European Regime
The Southern European welfare regime (Greece, Italy, and Spain) may be seen as a
variant of the Continental regime because of its adherence to traditional familial welfare
responsibilities. However, the socio-political structure of the Southern European
countries differs from that of the Continental countries. Southern Europe has a distinctive
type of welfare regime with features of universal national services in the health area and
income transfers in other areas (Ferrera 1996). Moreover, the persistence of patronage in
politics brings frequent changes to pension policies as political responses from the party
in power. Unpaid family labour is common for women, providing child care, elder care,
health care, and other services that the market provides in the Liberal regime. Women are
entitled to benefits and access to social services through their husband’s or father’s social
security coverage (Trifiletti 1999: 53). At the same time, women’s participation in the
labour market, particularly in the paid service sector, has increased in recent decades,
bringing changes to family structures. Financing of the social security system is
dominated by contribution-based social insurance schemes, differentiated by occupation,
as in the Continental welfare regime. Only registered workers and their dependents (in
contrast to employees in small firms and the self employed) have access to pensions,
health coverage, and social security. A basic means-tested plan provides these social
benefits to the disadvantaged segments of the population. Unlike the Social Democratic
and Continental regimes, only irregular and weak protections are available to workers.
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The Southern European countries are characterized by having, on average, the
oldest populations in our four groups, along with low labour force participation at ages
55–64, especially for women. The family was once the most important pillar in managing
social risks in the Southern European countries, but this pillar has lost its strength. The
significant decline in fertility rates presents new social and economic challenges. Public
spending as a percentage of GDP is relatively low, and half of this spending is for
pensions. As in the Social Democratic and Continental welfare regimes, net replacement
rates for pensions are high, at an average of 94 percent of former earnings for those
retirees who have access to public pensions (Table 3.4).
Pension plans in the Southern European countries can be seen as a less developed
form of the Continental European model. Social security institutions were established late
in the twentieth century, in contrast to their earlier introduction in the Continental and
Social Democratic regimes. The lack of institutionalized social security structures, and
the presence of political systems based on patronage, produce instability in public
pension policies. While attempts have been made to strengthen social security
institutions, some pension plans are being privatized in the face of budget deficits (OECD
2003b, 2004a; Natali and Rhodes 2004). The move toward re-commodification is not as
strong as in the Liberal countries, but it still represents an important aspect of pension
reform agendas in Southern Europe.
The early retirement option in pension plans is another factor that reduces the
labour force participation of older workers in Southern European countries. The pension
eligibility age in this group is among the youngest in OECD countries. As in the
Continental European countries, early retirement had been used during the 1980s and
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1990s to attempt to lower high unemployment rates among the young. Turkey, for
instance, which shows features similar to the Southern European cluster, eliminated the
minimum retirement age and permitted retirement in some cases after less than 15 years
of pension contributions. This led to persons retiring early and then joining the informal
sector while receiving their pension (Brook and Whitehouse 2006).
In the Southern European regime, the reforms of the 1990s and 2000s aimed to
secure financial sustainability by increasing the retirement age and implementing a
supplementary private pension scheme. Pension reforms in Southern Europe cover all
three of the Pierson categories: cost containment, recalibration, and re-commodification.
Recalibration is especially important in achieving welfare goals, given that the welfare
regime is less developed. In the reform agenda of these countries, improving the
effectiveness of pension programs is required to cope with widespread benefit abuse and
patronage, which threaten the future stability of welfare institutions. Raising pension
eligibility ages is the first reform undertaken both to improve financial sustainability and
cost containment and to rationalize a pension system under which life expectancy has
been increasing over time. Hence, raising the age at eligibility became the most common
feature of pension reforms in Southern European countries. In Italy, the normal pension
age for women was increased from 55 to 60 years and for men from 60 to 65 in 2004.
The early pension age for men with 35 years’ coverage increased from 60 to 62. In
Greece, the pension age increased from 58 to 65 after the 1990–92 reforms. In 2002,
Spain’s parliament passed a law penalizing early retirement. According to the new
system, workers can retire at age 61 but their pension would be 24 to 30 percent lower
than the full pension available at age 65 (OECD 2003b: 10).
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The 1995 Dini Reform in Italy improved long-term fiscal sustainability of
pensions by changing the benefit scheme from defined-benefit to defined contribution. In
all countries in the Southern European regime cluster, reforms favoured private pension
plans. Today, the pension system in Italy is a combination of compulsory pay-as-you-go
and private pension systems (OECD 2004a: 66). In Spain, tax advantages were given to
private pension schemes through the Toledo Pact of 1995. Similar regulations were
introduced in Italy and Greece in the 1990s and 2000s. In spite of tax incentives, private
pension plans are still in their infancy. In Spain, for instance, private pensions cover only
3 to 5 percent of total employment (OECD 2003b: 67).
3.3. Discussion: No Universal Public Policy for Ageing
Discussion of pension reform is overly focused on public finances (Esping Andersen and
Myles 2006). To facilitate the sustainability of pension systems, many analysts propose a
combination of contribution increases, benefit cuts, increases in retirement age, and
increases in the contribution period needed to qualify for full pensions. Intergenerational
social justice, however, is largely overlooked in these discussions. In effect, poverty rates
among the elderly have declined in most OECD countries, and the share of elderly among
the poor has also been reduced (OECD 2000: 56). The recent global economic downturn
particularly affects young people entering the labour market, rather than retirees who
have the benefit of guaranteed payments without increases in premiums. The economic
recession reduces the availability of well-paid standard jobs for labour force entrants.
According to the OECD, by the end of 2009 the unemployment rate is expected to be 2.02.5 percentage points higher than at the end of 2007. Especially in the United States and
Canada, the unemployment rate has increased about 3.0-4.0 percentage points since the
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economic recession began. Older people who had invested in private retirement plans lost
some of their savings, but the most significant impact will be on the younger generation,
especially in non-standard service-sector jobs.
These different vantage points according to generation are triggering debates
between workers, who are contributing to the pension system, and retirees, who are
benefiting from past contributions to the system. Phillipson (2000) argues that this
conflict can lead to a change in the perception of ageing from being a public/life-course
issue to being a private/life-stage problem. Even though ageing becomes a private
problem for an individual with a private pension plan, it also becomes a social and
political problem when dealing, for example, with the need for pension reform. That is,
the approaches to pensions and social security are linked with the demographic dynamics
of particular countries. All countries face ageing populations, but countries in the Social
Democratic regime cluster have shown greater ability to influence the level of
childbearing (McDonald 2006), along with an interest in maximizing labour force
participation of men and women to pay for generous social benefits. The Liberal regime
is based on greater privatization. (It also allows for greater reliance on immigration to
deal with demographic problems of a slower-growing labour force.) With their
differential treatment of different groups in society, the Continental and the Southern
European regimes have the most difficulty in achieving reforms, and they also face the
highest rates of population ageing. While the market plays a significant role in the
retirement and pension systems in the Liberal group, the state remains the key actor in the
Social Democratic group. In other European countries, however, the family (especially in
Southern Europe) still plays decisive roles in caring for the elderly. In spite of these
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differences, there are important uniformities across regimes, which include attempts to
delay retirement, to convert pensions to defined-contribution plans, and to have a higher
dependence on private plans, all in the interest of seeking to achieve sustainability.
This chapter shows that different welfare regimes have developed their own
approaches to public pension reform. The Liberal welfare regime countries focus on cost
containment and re-commodification; the Social Democratic countries on cost
containment and recalibration; the Continental and Southern European countries on cost
containment, recalibration, and re-commodification—each depending on their
endogenous structures and traditions.
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CHAPTER 4
THE WELFARE OF THE OLD: THE TURKISH WELFARE
REGIME AND TURKISH PENSION POLICIES

4.1. Introduction

As populations get older, the costs of welfare provisions pose serious challenges to
societies (OECD 1998). There has been significant debate on pension systems based on
pay-as-you-go (PAYG) schemes since the 1980s. Pension policies have been particularly
discussed and studied in Europe and North America (OECD 2000; Pierson et al. 2001;
Esping-Andersen and Myles 2006; Arza and Kohli et al. 2008). There are, however, few
studies analyzing welfare of the elderly and pension systems in newly industrializing and
recently ageing countries. In addition, welfare regimes of these countries and their
responses to challenges of population ageing and pension systems are generally
overlooked in the study of the welfare state literature.

At this point, Turkey is an interesting example, with its rapid economic growth in
the 2000s, European Union (EU) candidacy, an increasing political role in the Middle
East, and young population. Contrary to many welfare regimes in Europe, there are few
studies on the Turkish welfare regime. However, the Turkish welfare regime has
encountered significant changes due to the changes in the family, the state, and the
market (Bugra and Keyder 2006). These changes have brought to the research agenda
important questions regarding the Turkish welfare regime. This study seeks to answer the
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following questions. What are the roles of the family, the market, and local actors in the
management of social risks? Are public pension policies based on one’s employment
history adequate for the social security of the old citizens? Do we witness a neo-liberal
economic process in Turkish pension policies?

Hence, the purpose of this chapter is two-fold. First, it aims to highlight important
characteristics of the Turkish welfare regime and its pension policies. That is, it seeks to
examine how the welfare regime has evolved in view of actors representing the interests
of state, market, family, and local actors. Second, it aims to analyze the ways in which
the Turkish welfare regime and its pension policies are affecting the welfare of the old
across gender and generations. That is, it seeks to analyze how the pension system and its
transformation are affecting equity across various groups, including elements that are
progressive and regressive.

Having established the main purposes of the chapter, the analysis will be done as
follows. The first purpose involves evaluating the analyses of other researchers and using
comparative data from the Turkish Statistics Institute (TURKSTAT) and the
Organization for Economic Corporation and Development (OECD) in regards to
socioeconomic changes in Turkey. The second purpose will be achieved through studying
the pension reforms and the associated working documents, and analyzing the way in
which the costs and benefits of the pension system have been distributed across
population groups.

The contribution of this chapter to the literature is two-fold. First, it highlights the
main characteristics of the Turkish welfare regime, which have been underrepresented in
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the literature so far. Here the focus is on the roles of welfare actors— namely, the state,
the market, the family, and local actors. Despite some studies on the Turkish welfare
regime which focus on state policies (Boratav and Ozugurlu 2006; Bugra and Keyder
2006), this chapter focuses on other welfare actors. Second, it studies the welfare of the
old in Turkey using the welfare regime approach. While there are some studies focusing
on the general characteristics of the social policies in Turkey (see for example, Bugra and
Keyder 2003; Yakut-Cakar 2007) and others that focus on the economic impacts of the
pension reforms (see for example, Brook and Whitehouse 2006; Elveren 2008b), this
paper scrutinizes the welfare of the elderly and pension reforms in light of the welfare
regime approach.

This study claims that the Turkish welfare regime is undergoing significant
transformations through the impact of internal and external dynamics. Contrary to what
has been documented in other countries, it is difficult to argue that the Turkish welfare
regime has transformed to a Liberal welfare regime dominated by market actors, or to a
Social Democratic welfare regime based on a universalist and right-based system. While
on the one hand, Turkey’s EU accession process, an ageing population, and increasing
living standards induces the state to play a more active role in the welfare of the old, on
the other hand, increasing social expenditures necessitate the state to collaborate with
other actors, especially the market. This chapter will argue that while families are losing
their dominance on welfare distribution, the state, the market, and local actors are
strengthening their roles in the Turkish welfare regime. In order to understand the
increasing role of the state and transformation of the Turkish welfare regime, the pension
system and pension reforms are important. During the 2000s, there have been important
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developments that have enabled a sustainable and fair pension system in Turkey. This
research indicates that recalibration is the main target of the recent pension reforms.

This chapter is organized as follows. After the introduction, the second section
examines the Turkish welfare regime and its actors. This section discusses how welfare is
distributed through the family, the market, the state, and local actors. The third section
analyses the welfare of the old with particular focus on pension policies and pension
reforms. Also, this section discusses the problems of pension policies in terms of gender
and intergenerational equity. Finally, in the last section, policy recommendations for a
better pension system will be briefly discussed in light of the Turkish welfare regime.

4.2. Highlighting the General Characteristics of the Turkish Welfare Regime

Traditional analyses of the welfare state focusing on public expenditure are inadequate to
examine the welfare distribution in contemporary societies (Esping-Andersen 1990: 2-3).
Contrary to the concept of the welfare state, which is narrowly associated with state
expenditures, the term welfare regime focuses on not only state expenditures, but also the
market, the family, and local actors in welfare distribution. Hence, centering on societies
and social actors helps researchers to better understand the welfare mix of the newly
industrializing countries and allows for a deeper cross-national comparative analysis.

There are four major actors—the state, the family, the market, and local actors—
in welfare distribution, and these actors are important in classifying societies according to
welfare regimes. For example, while the market is an important player in the Liberal
welfare regime as is the case in the US and Canada, in the Social Democratic welfare
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regime (e.g., in Denmark and Sweden) the state is the main player. Similar to the
Southern European welfare regime, the family and local actors play a significant role in
the Turkish welfare regime.

In welfare regime groupings, some comparative studies include Turkey in the
Southern European welfare regime (Gough 1996; Bugra and Keyder 2006; Yakut-Cakar
2007; Gal 2010; Aysan 2011). There is also a small body of research that assigns Turkey
to a “Middle Eastern” group. In these studies, it is argued that the state has a relatively
limited role in welfare distribution and that religion is an important determinant in the
formation of social policies (Karshenas and Moghadam et al. 2006; Jawad and YakutCakar 2010). Others report that the Turkish welfare regime is a combination of the
2

Southern European and Middle Eastern welfare groups (Aybars and Tsarouhas 2010). It
seems that we need a more cross-national approach in order to better understand the
similarities and differences between the Turkish welfare regime and other welfare
regimes.

The Turkish welfare regime has undergone significant changes in respects to the
family, the state, and the market (Bugra and Keyder 2006). On the one hand, social and
economic criteria for EU accession have prompted the Turkish state to play an active role
in welfare distribution. On the other hand, privatization processes defended by the
Bretton Woods Institutions (the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund) lead

2

It seems that it is difficult to construct a welfare group that contains all Middle Eastern countries.
Although they have similar religious and cultural features (Jawad and Yakut-Cakar 2010), oil-rich gulf
countries diverge from other countries in the region because of their natural resources and relatively strong
state involvement in the welfare distribution.
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markets to play an important role in the distribution of welfare in Turkey. Changes in
family structure and increases in the labour force participation of young and educated
women lead the family to lose its dominant role in welfare distribution in this regime. At
the same time, globalization and localization trends enhance the role of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and local actors in the management of social risks.
In light of aforementioned trends, the main characteristics of the Turkish welfare regime
can be summarized as follows:

1) Welfare is distributed through a family-centered patriarchal structure (Bugra
and Keyder 2006; Gal 2010; Aysan 2011).

2) Based on traditional and religious values, local actors, such as kinship or home
township groups and other religious non-profit organizations, play a significant
role in welfare distribution (Jawad and Yakut-Cakar 2010, Gal 2010).

3) The market has a relatively minor but increasing role in welfare distribution.

4) The state has a moderate role in welfare distribution, except with regards to
education and to some extent health care. Also, populism and patronage are two
important welfare distribution forms used by governments.

4.2.1. The Family

The World Values Survey (2011) indicates that Turkey has one of the highest scores on
importance of marriage and family, along with Italy and Egypt (see Figure 4.A.1 and
Figure 4.A.2). According to this survey, 95 percent of Turks, which is the highest
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percentage among OECD countries, think that marriage is not outdated. Among the
different types of relationship status, “divorced” is the least common, at only 1 percent,
while the OECD average is 4 percent (OECD 2011b). Although Turkey has a relatively
stable family formation compared to other OECD countries, there are significant changes
in family formation and gender roles due to social and economic challenges. For
example, Aytac and Rankin (2009) show that contrary to previous research, economic
difficulties in the family have a direct impact on marital problems and an indirect impact
on women via emotional distress. The significant increase in crude divorce rates over the
period 1970-2008 also shows the challenges to Turkish families. While the crude divorce
rate was 0.3 per thousand in 1970, it increased to 1.4 per thousand in 2008 (OECD
2011c).

In this regime, welfare is distributed based on the gendered division of labour in
the family. While men are responsible for meeting the economic needs of the household,
women are responsible for unpaid domestic labour, such as caring and housekeeping. Not
only child care, but also elder care is provided by women in this welfare regime. As
Table 4.1 presents, Turkish women do more unpaid house work than other women in
OECD countries with 377 minutes per day. Also, in other Southern European countries,
such as in Italy and Portugal, women spend more time on unpaid work than men. Women
from the Liberal and Continental European countries spend relatively less time on unpaid
housework (e.g. US with 258 minutes and Germany with 269 minutes) when compared
with women from the Southern European countries. As Table 4.1 shows, the
Scandinavian countries with the smallest gender gap in unpaid work are also those
countries where men devote relatively more time to unpaid work. While Turkish and
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Portuguese women spend 4 hours more per day on unpaid work than men, the difference
between genders is only around an hour per day in the Scandinavian countries (e.g.
Norway with 225 minutes).

Table 4.1.
Unpaid Work by Gender across OECD over the period 1998-2009,
in minutes per day
Female
unpaid work

Male
unpaid
work

Difference
between genders

Turkey
Portugal
Italy
Spain

377
328
326
294

116
96
103
107

260
232
223
187

Australia
Ireland
New Zealand
United Kingdom
United States
Canada

311
296
294
273
258
248

172
129
158
150
154
146

139
167
136
123
104
102

Netherlands
Austria
Germany
France

273
269
269
258

163
135
164
136

110
134
105
122

Sweden
Finland
Denmark
Norway

249
245
243
225

177
154
186
152

72
91
57
73

OECD Average

279

131

148

Source: Miranda 2011, Figure 5, pp. 13.

The family is the prominent actor in the management of social risks in Southern
European and Middle Eastern societies, and Turkey. The Southern European welfare
regime is characterized by a preference for family solutions to welfare problems (Ferrera
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1996; Mingione 2001; Gal 2010). In this regime, the family is considered as an
alternative to state institutions for people—in other words, they rely on either their
families, some extended forms of kinship, or other social networks (Mingione 2001;
Saraceno 2002).

In a subsequent section (section 4.3) it will be documented that, in Turkey, young
adults usually live with their parents until they get married, while many seniors reside
with their children when they become very old or disabled. The welfare distribution is
heavily based on informal strategies of household income maintenance (Grutjen 2008).
This is particularly common in urban areas where an extended family type is a standard.
As is the case in the Southern European welfare regime, seniors contribute to the income
of the household through their pensions and other incomes (Albertini et al. 2007).

In Turkey, the family receives little public support in the form of child benefits
and family allowances. Paid maternal leave is very low (with 16 weeks) when compared
to other OECD countries, such as 52 weeks in UK. Paternal leave is also low in Turkey.
What is most disconcerting, however, is paternal leave has a duration of only three days
in length and is only available to civil servants. A lack of affordable high quality social
services for children and seniors in the market, and a lack of state support with regards to
family care, both contribute to increase the burden of women in Turkey. This problem
mainly leads women’s labour force participation to remain very low in the Southern
European countries and Turkey compared to other OECD countries. For example, in
2009 the labour force participation for women was 77.8 percent in Sweden, 75.7 percent
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in Canada, and 71.3 percent in Germany, whereas it was only 57.2 percent in Greece,
51.6 percent in Italy, and 29.1 percent in Turkey (OECD 2011a).

Increasing education levels, employment rates, and societal expectations for
women to preserve their traditional caring roles as homemakers, converge and create a
double burden for women (Hochschild and Machung 2003). It is in this regard that the
adult generations, especially those of women, become what is referred to as a “sandwich
generation” – a generation captured by responsibilities for their children and their
parents. The impacts of work-family conflict on fertility could have been partially
mitigated with the help of institutional arrangements, such as paternal leaves, childcare
benefits, and tax benefits as in many Scandinavian countries (Gauthier 1996). Also,
institutional arrangements that help women to balance work and family are inadequate in
Turkey as well as in the Southern European countries and Japan (Boling 2008; McDonald
2006). The low total fertility rate in these countries is one of the outcomes of limited
public support for families. The fertility rates in Turkey, for example, declined
significantly in the 1980s and 1990s. While the total fertility rate was 5.00 in 1970, it
declined to below replacement level with 2.06 in 2009 (TURKSTAT 2011).

Even though the labour force participation of women is relatively lower in Turkey
when compared to other OECD countries, labour force participation has increased
significantly among educated young women in urban areas (Aysan 2008). According to
TURKSTAT (2011), the number of employed women who have a university degree
increased about four times between 1990 and 2010. The increase in the labour force
participation rates for women in urban Turkey also evidences this trend. As Table 4.2
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shows, while the labour force participation rate for women had increased in all age
groups, it fell for men in all age groups between 1990 and 2010. The increase in the
labour force participation rates for women was especially significant in younger age
groups (20-24 and 25-29). In these age groups, women have about half of men’s labour
force participation, while in other age groups the labour force participation gap is 4 or 5
times greater.

Table 4.2.
Urban Labour Force Participation by Age and Gender, Turkey, 1990-2010

1990
1995
2000
2005
2010

2024
84.7
76.1
66.0
71.9
70.1

2529
97.4
95.9
91.5
94.1
93.1

3034
98.4
98.1
95.9
96.2
96.5

3539
98.3
98.3
96.1
96.2
96.4

1990
1995
2000
2005
2010

25.3
24.4
25.6
29.5
35.1

20.7
22.3
24.9
29.5
36.9

21.8
21.3
21.9
24.3
33.1

22.4
20.5
20.6
24.8
33.3

Men
404544
49
95.6 87.7
94.7 83.1
92.9 79.1
93.8 79.5
94.4 83.5
Women
18.5 10.7
17.8 12.1
17.6 11.1
20.2 14.9
30.4 20.0

5054
66.9
69.3
58.8
58.4
60.6

5559
49.8
50.7
43.0
41.5
41.1

6064
32.9
34.6
27.9
24.8
27.6

65+
16.2
17.0
14.0
11.9
10.7

Total
79.7
77.8
73.7
70.6
70.8

6.5
7.5
8.0
9.4
12.9

4.3
5.0
4.5
6.0
7.8

3.0
3.2
2.5
3.5
4.0

0.9
2.5
1.4
1.7
1.5

34.2
30.9
26.6
23.3
27.6

Note: Total Labour force participation is for the whole population including rural population.
Source: TURKSTAT 2011, http://tuik.gov.tr.

Table 4.3 shows the percentage of women in various sectors and total employment
between 1990 and 2010. In 1990, 75 percent of women worked in agriculture, 14.7 in the
service sector, and 9.8 in industry. In 2010, although the number of employed women
was still the highest in agriculture, the number of employed women in the service and
industry sectors tripled and doubled, respectively, within two decades. While the
percentage of employed women in agriculture fell to 42.4 percent, the percentages
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increased to 15.9 in industry, and 41.7 in services. However, in spite of significant
increases in the service and industry sectors during the period 1990-2010, the total
number of employed women increased only about half a million due to a decline in the
agricultural employment of women.

3

Table 4.3.
Distribution of Women by Various Economic Sectors, Turkey, 1990-2010 i
Agriculture

1990
1995
2000
2005
2010

Total
Number
4,428
4,255
3,508
2,367
2,724

%
75.0
71.2
60.5
46.3
42.4

Industry ii
Total
Number
576
572
763
850
1,022

%
9.8
9.6
13.2
16.6
15.9

Services iii
Total
Number
868
1,148
1,529
1,892
2,680

%
14.7
19.2
26.4
37.0
41.7

Total
Total
Number
5,902
5,976
5,800
5,108
6,425

%
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0

Notes: i) Thousand person, age 15 and over.
ii) Industry as the sum of manufacturing, mining, quarrying, electricity, gas, and water, construction
sectors.
iii) Service as the sum of finance, business, retail, real estate, social services, transportation, and
restaurant.
Source: TURKSTAT 2011, http://tuik.gov.tr.

Significant increases in young women’s labour force participation in urban areas as well
as the continuation of traditional gender roles in society pose important threats not only to
women but also to families. Due to changes in family formation and the increase in

3

The fact is that lack of job opportunities in service or industry sectors for unskilled agricultural workers
who migrated to urban areas led to a decrease in labour force participation rates recently (see Table 4.2).
This is also valid for women. Women, working as a family worker in agriculture and doing domestic work
at home, are considered as employed according to TURKSTAT. When they migrate to urban areas, they
become homemakers due to the lack of work opportunities outside of the home for these unskilled women.
Traditional values that consider women’s work outside of the home inappropriate also affect women’s
labour force participation. However, increase in the number of educated women has positively affected
women’s labour force participation since the 1980s.
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labour force participation among young women who are responsible for caring in the
family, families are losing their main role in the distribution of welfare. The importance
of the family in social welfare and challenges to its traditional roles are key matters in the
transformation of the Turkish welfare regime.

4.2.2. Local Actors and NGOs

In addition to the family, another important player in the Turkish welfare regime is local
actors. These institutions can be shaped by a particular religious or political group as well
as by people who migrated from the same rural regions. The influence of religion and
religious values is especially significant in the formation of social welfare in Turkey as
well as in the Middle East (Jawad and Cakar 2010). Therefore, the Turkish welfare
regime cannot be understood without analyzing Islamic tradition. For Muslim dominated
countries and the Ottoman State (the predecessor of today’s Turkey), Islam was the main
determinant of the charitable activities in society and social policies of the state. Zakat
(obligatory alms) and sadaka (alms) have noteworthy roles to reduce inequality and to
provide the basic needs of the poor. Zakat, one of the five pillars of Islam, is the giving of
2.5 percent of one’s surplus wealth every year to the poor and needy. In Islamic history,
apart from zakat and sadaka, various forms of assistance for the poor and the needy were
carried through charitable foundations. Since these assistances—zakat and sadaka—are
generally not documented officially, it is difficult to estimate the amount of assistance
given to people in need. However, the religious orientation of the population encourages
high charitable contributions.
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Traditional foundations, Vakıfs, are major institutions shaped by Islamic
jurisprudence to manage basic social risks within a community and to improve the living
standards of people. Vakıf, as a religious institution, has a long history which goes back to
the 11th century in Turkey (Directorate General of Foundations 2011). It is an institution
which devotes its profits to charitable activities for good deeds. Compared to European
and American counterparts, these institutions are slightly different due to the organization
and functions of vakıfs. In many regions of Turkey and territories ruled by the Ottoman
State, where the state could not meet the basic needs of people, vakıfs undertook social
responsibilities. Their services extend into the areas of education, health, shelter,
infrastructure, and religion. Even though many Ottoman vakıfs have disappeared, there
are still many vakıfs heavily influenced by religious and traditional values which have
continued to provide social services not only for Turkish citizens but also for other needy
people outside of the country.

Especially since the 1980s, the state encourages NGOs and private companies to
participate in social welfare projects. The Law number 5253 on associations which
passed in 2004 improved the legal status of NGOs. This law allowed NGOs to constitute
their own social welfare projects with limited government controls. The state has also
tried to encourage private firms and companies to finance social projects. The Marmara
Earthquake in 1999 prompted in the development of NGOs, and especially non-profit
organizations. Inadequate state involvement in relieving the problems of people affected
by the earthquake, and significant success of non-profit organizations in the earthquake
region, helped these organizations to become popular and trustworthy in Turkish society.
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In 2011, around 10 percent of the population was a member of an association and
there were about 87,700 associations and 46,000 vakıfs in Turkey (Department of
Associations 2011). There are two major associations—charity associations and
hometown associations—in welfare distribution. Charity associations, which compose
about 20 percent of all associations, are established to solve various social problems such
as poverty, hunger, shelter, and education. Hometown associations, which compose about
18 percent of all associations, are established to create solidarity for fellow countrymen in
the cities (Department of Associations 2011). Contrary to charity associations, they are
established to achieve group solidarity and they can operate a political lobby in the cities.
The high rate of charity associations and hometown associations, when compared with all
other associations, indicates how these associations occupy an important role in welfare
distribution.

Among these organizations, faith-based charity organizations have significant
success in dealing with social needs (Bugra 2007; Gal 2010). For example, Deniz Feneri
(the Lighthouse), Kimse Yok mu? (Is anybody there?), and IHH (the Foundation for
Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief) are some of the biggest faithbased charity organizations which have social services and aid programs ranging from
Haiti to Africa. For example, the Lighthouse association spent about US$ 45 million cash
and in kind for social welfare activities in 2010 (Lighthouse 2011). Since 1989, tax
deduction incentives for both public benefit associations and foundations have
encouraged people to donate to these non-profit organizations. In 2011, there were 474
public charitable associations and 222 foundations registered as public benefit
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association, and donors can apply for tax exemption up to 5 percent of their annual
income, if they donate specially to these organizations (TUSEV 2011).

4.2.3. The Market

The third actor in welfare distribution is the market. Due to the minimal and residual role
of the state, in some welfare regimes such as US and UK, the market plays a significant
role in the management of the social risks. In Turkey, however, due to the strong statist
economic policies, the market did not have a significant role in any aspect of social life,
especially in welfare distribution, until the 1980s. With the implementation of exportoriented industrialization and neo-liberal policies, the private sector started to flourish
after the 1980s (Boratav 2005). Parallel to neo-liberal trends in the world, the new
economic policies led to privatization of state-owned enterprises, subcontracting, and
flexibilization of labour markets. There were two main consequences with regard to
welfare distribution. First, the state gradually withdrew from its important welfare role—
as an employer and provider—through privatization of state-owned enterprises. Second,
neo-liberalism led private entrepreneurs to invest in various sectors which have
traditionally been provided by the state, such as health care and education. These trends
brought new challenges to workers who work in relatively secure and well-paid jobs in
the public as well as private sector. The result was evident, while the export increased
about 5.5 times from $1.7 million to $11 million, average real wages declined
approximately 34 percent over the period 1977-1987 (TURKSTAT 2011).

During the 1990s and 2000s, the market started to play a more active role in
welfare distribution in Turkey. For instance, while the number of primary and secondary
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school students in public schools increased about 16 percent from 11.4 million to 13.3
million, the number of students in private schools increased 370 percent from 106
thousand to 396 thousand over the period 1992-2010. Various reforms during the 2000s
increased the number of social services provided by the market. For example, the heath
care reform, Law no. 5502 on Universal Health Insurance was enacted in 2006. This law,
which accompanies Law no. 5510 on Social Security and Universal Health Insurance,
aimed to unify health services of different occupation-based social security institutions
(ES, SSK, and Bağ-Kur). The new law not only brings uniformity to health care services,
but also presents different choices to the patients. Those who have social security
coverage from any of three social security institutions can choose to receive heath care
services from private hospitals. Patients need to pay extra charges beyond the average
prices of health service limits set by the Social Security Institution. The reform had a
significant effect on the expansion of private hospitals in health care. Between 2002 and
2008, while the number of public hospitals increased about 10 percent from 824 to 904,
the number of private hospitals increased about 48 percent from 270 to 400 (Ministry of
Health 2010). Also, the number of private hospital visits significantly increase in the
same period. While the number of hospital visits increased about two times in average,
the number of hospital visits increased 7 times for private hospitals (Ministry of Health
2010).

Another reform of social services enacted in 2005 increased the number of private
social service providers in various areas, such as rehabilitation, disability, elderly care.
Parallel to health care services, costs of the private social services are covered by the state
for those who cannot afford to pay costs of the services. The number of people who
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choose private social services providers is expected to increase about 65 percent from
19,600 to 32,240 over the period 2009-2014.

However, it is difficult to agree with Yakut-Cakar (2007) who claims the
privatization of health care services deepened social inequalities. For example, after the
reform, these benefits of the Green Card system, which provides free health care services
for the poor, were equalized with the benefits of other social security systems. Also, for
the first time, free health services have been provided to children under the age of 18
regardless of the social security coverage of their parents. In this regard, as discussed in
the next section, rather than simply liberalizing social services, the state aims to
collaborate with other welfare actors to provide efficient and high quality social services
to mitigate the rising cost of an ageing population.

4.2.4. The State

4.2.4.1. The Turkish State: Moderate role

The Turkish state has a paternalistic character inherited from the Ottoman state. The
concept of the state as the “father” of the nation retains more than a symbolic value for
Turkish people (Bugra 2004; Aybars and Tsarouhas 2010). However, compared to oilrich countries in the Middle East, the Turkish state lacks natural and financial resources
to distribute. Hence, the state has a moderate role in welfare distribution. This
paternalistic mentality, based on the idea that state involvement in social welfare is a gift
rather than a citizenship right, has been inherited from the Ottoman State (Bugra 2004).
The Ottoman State had a regulatory role in the formation of welfare distribution rather
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than as a direct actor. As highlighted, local actors, especially vakıfs, played an active role
in meeting various needs.

Similar to Turkey, the role of the state in welfare distribution is considered as
“residual” in the Southern European and Middle Eastern countries. Social policies have
nation-building and developmentalist objectives in Turkey, rather than being built on the
idea of social citizenship rights and a welfare state (Boratav and Ozugurlu 2006; Aybars
and Tsarouhas 2010: 749). While the state is motivated by a traditional paternalistic
approach, the state is generally not seen as a key player in the distribution of welfare in
the Southern European countries (Ferrera 1996) in Turkey (Bugra 2004).

The statist (or etatist) approach, championing the role of the state in economic
growth, was the main ideology of the Turkish Republic until the 1950s. The Turkish state
continued to be the biggest employer in various economic sectors ranging from finance to
mining until the 1980s (Boratav 2005). The state always had surplus workers in its
factories and it purchased products from farmers to support the national economy and the
labour market. In fact, significant state involvement in economic questions was a way of
“indirect” welfare distribution which was exploited by political parties.

Contrary to some European countries, social security services, such as health care,
pension allowances, and family allowances were institutionalized later in Turkey.
However, the corporatist character of the Continental European regime is shared by
Turkey as well as the Southern European welfare regime. As will be discussed in the next
section (section 4.3), the Turkish welfare regime is highly dependent on the membership
of occupationally defined groups— namely, civil servants, workers and self employed
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people. It is inegalitarian in nature, especially with regards to its exclusion of some
groups from the formal labour market (see Table 4.6 for the number of insured people).

Until the 1950s, social policies in Turkey were mostly concerned with protecting
civil servants’ pension and health service entitlements. As will be mentioned below, due
to the corporatist characteristic of the Turkish welfare regime, pension and health care
services had been organized according to employees’ occupations until the 2006 social
security reform. In this regard, similar to the Southern European welfare regime, the
existence of universal health provision alongside a flourishing private health market,
posed a seminal characteristic of the Turkish welfare regime.

In spite of welfare reforms and economic developments, over 80 percent of
people in Turkey, Italy, and Portugal think that benefits and economic gains were not
distributed fairly (OECD 2008a: 15). This problem may be closely related to cultural and
institutional reasons, such as the significant role of families in welfare distribution, high
levels of tolerance to poverty and inequality, and particularly less state accountability
(Bugra and Adar 2008; Ferreira 2008). Also, according to Ferrera (1996) and Gal (2010)
ineffectiveness and fragmentation in the social security system result in significant
economic and social gaps among different groups of society in these countries. In the
Turkish case, the main social welfare roles of the state are considered to be education and
to some extent health care.
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4.2.4.2. Patronage and Populism: A Way of Welfare Distribution

As indicated, the state plays a relatively limited role in terms of its ability to distribute
welfare. There are, however, other ways which are considerably more crude and informal
to distribute welfare in the society. This section asserts that although they are losing their
importance in the welfare distribution, there are two main paths—patronage and
populism—in the Turkish welfare regime.
4

The terms patronage and clientalism are commonly used interchangeably. The
term patronage refers to the use of state resources to reward particular groups such as
partisans to get their electoral support (Piattoni 2001: 5). This patronage is closely related
to clientalism, which is the distribution of resources in the public administration by
political leaders (patrons) to their supporters (clients). In extreme circumstances, the term
patronage refers to a type of corruption in which a political party in power illegally
rewards its partisans for their political support. In this regard, patronage or clientelism is
one of the conventional forms in which interests are represented and promoted— this
constitutes a practical solution to the problem of democratic representation (Piattoni
2001:18). Indeed, due to social and economic empowerment within various groups,
clientalistic relationships in peasant societies and among recent migrants to the cities are
common (Roniger 2004).

4

According to Piattoni (2001), patronage has two meanings. First, it serves to point out the distribution of
administrative positions to partisans to keep the “organic” structure between politicians and their electors.
For example, in the British political tradition, the Prime Minister is allowed to appoint the ministers of the
government who support the political party of the Prime Minister. Second, patronage is used to show the
use of political power to distribute jobs, goods, and resources to partisans to strengthen position of the
politician.
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According to Ferrera (1996) and Gal (2010), patronage and clientelism in the
Southern European countries are linked to historical commonalities—particularly those
that are related to the process of political mobilisation and the establishment of state
institutions in these countries. It seems in countries like Turkey, which experienced a
rapid urbanization process and high rural-urban domestic migration, patronage is
considered to be a general welfare distribution mechanism in return for political support
in the elections. Clientalistic relations are strengthened by ongoing political tensions
among political parties and ideologies as well as weak political institutions. For example,
in the congress of his political party, a previous Minister of Interior could declare that he
and his predecessor from the same party had collectively employed 3,000 judges who
were affiliated with their party during their administrative terms. He also questioned:
“Should I have appointed the members of rival political parties to these positions instead
of my own party?” (Aksiyon 1995).

Populism is the second informal welfare distribution mechanism applied by local
and national administrations. Unlike patronage or clientelism, populism benefits the
masses in the hopes of gaining the majority of voters. Therefore, contrary to the
arguments of Aybars and Tsarouhas (2010), populism is different from patronage in the
way it is practiced and in terms of the population it targets. For example, as pointed out in
the next section, decreasing the official retirement age before an election is a type of
populism which negatively impacts the long run sustainability of the pension system and
public budget. Therefore, despite financial damages in the long term, politicians apply
populist policies to gain a majority of electors’ votes for upcoming elections.
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Another method of populist welfare distribution is accomplished by condoning
the illegal construction of homes (squatter settlements or gecekondu in Turkish) on public
land in the periphery of cities. The formation of squatter settlements denotes a process
whereby lower income migrants from rural areas find informal solutions to their basic
shelter needs within urban regulations (Saracgil 1999). Starting from the 1940s, squatter
settlements began to emerge in big cities due to rapid internal migration and a lack of
urban planning. According to Isik and Pinarcioglu (2001), in addition to local network
relationships (relatives and people from the same hometown), local resettlement policies
(or lack of resettlement policies for newcomers) helped new migrants to emancipate from
poverty through squatter settlements in the periphery of cities. Local administrators had
neither the power nor the intention to stop the illegal construction of squatter settlements
(Saracgil 1999). Being potential electors, by the 2000s local administrators permitted new
migrants to construct new squatter settlements by providing amnesty to squatters and as
well as basic infrastructure services. Therefore, patronage and populism, which emerged
in various forms, constitute two informal welfare distribution strategies used by the state
in the Turkey.

To sum up, the family is the main actor in the Turkish welfare regime, whereas
gender is the key factor that determines roles of family members in welfare distribution.
While men are responsible for meeting the economic needs of the household, women are
responsible for unpaid domestic labour. However, traditional Turkish families have been
challenged by socio-economic and cultural dynamics. These challenges not only
influence traditional families but also the welfare regime in general and the welfare of the
old in particular. In addition to families, local actors are important players in welfare
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distribution. Hometown relations, NGOs, and vakıfs are some of the local actors that
formally and informally distribute the welfare among social groups. Despite its increasing
role through neo-liberal reforms, the market has a relatively minor role in welfare
distribution. Compared to the Social Democratic countries, the Turkish state has a
relatively moderate role in welfare distribution. Populism and patronage are two
noteworthy strategies that governments use to distribute welfare.

4.3. The Welfare of the Old and Pension Policies in Turkey

Compared to other age groups, the state plays a more active role in the welfare of the old.
Pension benefits are the central tool that helps the state to distribute welfare. Hence, this
section will examine the welfare of the old particularly in light of the state and pension
policies.

Incomes of the elderly (aged 65 and over) are generally lower than those of the
total population in OECD countries. According to OECD (2011b) estimations, on
average people aged 65 and over had incomes that were about 83 percent of the whole
population in the mid-2000s. Between the mid-1980s and the mid-2000s while incomes
of elderly increased faster than those of the whole population in many OECD countries,
incomes of the elderly dropped about 13 percent in Turkey (OECD 2011b). With this
decline in older people’s incomes between the mid-1980s and the mid-2000s in Turkey,
5

the old-age poverty rate was slightly higher at 15.1 percent compared to the OECD

5

Poverty rates are defined by the OECD as the share of individuals with equivalised disposable income less
than 40, 50 and 60 percent of the median for the entire population.
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average of 13.5 percent in the mid-2000s (OECD 2011d). However, the poverty gap
between Turkey and the OECD average is higher for the total population. In the same
period, the poverty rate, on average, was 10.6 percent for the whole population in OECD,
while it was 17.5 percent in Turkey. The poverty ratio of the elderly to the whole
population was 1.27 in OECD, it was 0.86 in Turkey.

4.3.1. The Welfare of the Old: The Family

Parallel to its significant role in the management of different social risks over the
lifecourse, the family is an important actor in handling social risks of seniors. As
indicated before, child and senior care are among the main functions of families. In their
cross-national research, Guerrero and Naldini (1996) show that despite the rapid family
transformation, the Southern European societies have a high degree of cross-generational
cohabitation compared to Scandinavian and Continental European countries.
Comparative OECD data on family structure in the 2000s supports Guerrero and
Naldini’s findings. According to the OECD (2011c), it is a common phenomenon to see
different generations—children, parents, and grandparents—living in the same household
in Turkey, as well as other Southern European countries. For the age group 20-34, 60
percent of children live with their parents in Turkey, 52 percent in Spain, and 51 percent
in Italy, but is only 25 percent in the UK, 24 percent in Germany, and 8 percent in
Denmark (OECD 2011c). Also, in Turkey, extended families that consist of children,
parents, and grandparents are very common, particularly in rural areas where earning and
caring are shared by younger and older generations. According to TURKSTAT (2006a),
while 10 percent of households were extended families in urban areas, it was 18 percent
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in rural areas in 2006. OECD (2011b) data show the importance of family support and
sharing the same household in the welfare of the Turkish elderly. In Turkey, households
headed by a single person aged 65 and over have incomes of only about 48 percent of
those households headed by someone of the same age group but composed of two or
more adults (OECD 2011b: 147).

Even if children and parents live in separate households, children care for their
senior parents in hard times. In particular, when parents become disabled or get very old,
they start living with children. TURKSTAT (2006a) data on life choices of individuals
about old-age support this phenomenon. In 2006, while 50 percent of respondents who
live in urban areas said that they are planning to live with their children when they get
old, 65 percent of respondents who live in rural areas gave the same response
(TURKSTAT 2006a).

In addition to caring and social support among different generations, there are
also financial transfers between older and younger generations. Hence, there is a
reciprocal relationship within families in terms of social (caring) and financial (money)
transfers. Albertini et al. (2007) have shown that there is a downward social and financial
transfer flow from older parents to younger adults in all welfare regimes. However, using
mostly European data on health and ageing, Daatland and Lowenstein (2005) and
Albertini et al. (2007) found that social and financial transfers from older parents to
younger adults are more intense in the Southern European countries than in the Social
Democratic and the Continental European countries. This downward flow is also the case
for the Turkish welfare regime in which older parents are involved in child care and
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support their children’s household income with their pension incomes or other resources.
For instance, after mothers, grandmothers are responsible for childcare of the 0-5 year
age group in the household. In 2006, 3.3 percent of children aged 0-5 were cared by their
grandmothers, while only 0.5 percent of them were cared by their fathers (TURKSTAT
2006a). Therefore, contrary to the general assumption which considers the elderly as a
burden on society, downward social and financial transfers in families show that the
elderly have a noteworthy role in the distribution of welfare across generations. Pensions
and other incomes are used to contribute to the welfare of the younger adults in the
family. Hence, in light of Daatland and Lowenstein (2005) and Albertini et al. (2007)
findings, it can be observed that public pensions for the old are shared by younger
generations as well.

4.3.2. The welfare of the Old: Local Actors and NGOs

Local actors and NGOs play a relatively a minor role compared to the family in the
welfare of the old. Their role is mostly achieved through cash and in kind transfers to the
needy elderly. Unfortunately, data limitations on the age structure of aid recipients make
it difficult to document the age groups that mostly benefit from aid. There is also a lack
of data on which specific groups are targeted by NGOs.

In addition to aid, there are also other social services provided by local actors,
such as elderly homes—accommodation facilities intended for the elderly. Elderly homes
are mostly managed by the state agency, the General Directorate of Social Services and
Child Protection Agency (SHÇEK), or Sosyal Hizmetler ve Çocuk Esirgeme Kurumu, in
Turkish. In 2011, out of 23,213 elderly living in elderly homes, 61 percent of them were
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staying in public elderly homes, while 25 percent and 14 percent of them were staying in
elderly homes managed by private entrepreneurs and NGOs (SHÇEK 2011). There were
only about 3,400 people living in elderly homes managed by NGOs. Despite the minor
roles of NGOs in elderly care, in order to increase the quantity and quality of social
services the General Directorate of Social Services plans to collaborate more with the
private sector and NGOs (SHÇEK 2009).

4.3.3. The Welfare of the Old: The Market

In the 1980s and 1990s, in line with a neo-liberal paradigm, the pension system evolved
toward a market-oriented structure (Elveren 2008b: 214). One of the important
developments was the introduction of the voluntary pension systems as a third tier in
addition to occupational PAYG systems. The law no. 4632 on Individual Pension System
(henceforth IPS) came into force and a third tier of the Turkish pension system was
constituted in 2001. After some regulatory changes that strengthen the base of IPS, it
commenced in 2003 with the participation of six private pension companies. The aims of
the IPS were to provide additional retirement income to middle and high income earners,
to increase national savings by directing participants’ savings into long-term financial
investments, and to make the financial markets stronger (Elveren 2008b; PMC 2010).
Contributors in the IPS can retire at age 56 after ten years of contribution and they may
choose to get back their investments in the form of an annuity or to obtain a lump-sum
payment on retirement (Elveren 2008a: 44).

Contrary to the World Bank and the IMF, which support private schemes, Orszag
and Stiglitz (2001) assert that private pension schemes are not always the right direction
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for social welfare. Even though defined contribution private pension schemes are
important income resources for many retirees, there are significant critiques to these
plans due to low returns and high operation costs. According to Elveren (2008b),
voluntary pension schemes would disadvantage women and lower income classes in
countries like Turkey, with its unstable labour market based on a gendered division of
labour and high wage fluctuations among occupational groups.

Despite critiques of the private pension systems, the number of participants in the
IPS increased in the period between 2003 and 2011. As Table 4.4 indicates, in December
2003, when the IPS was established, there were only about 15,000 participants in this
voluntary pension system, while it increased to about 2.4 million participants in April
2011. The total accumulated contributions also increased over the period from 5.9 million
in 2003 to about 10.3 billion in April 2011. According to Pension Monitoring Center
(PMC 2010), while total funds accumulated in the private pension system are only 1
percent of GDP in 2009, it is expected that the total funds accumulated will reach 10
percent of GDP by 2023 (PMC 2010). Clearly, tax deduction incentives offered by the
government play a significant role in the enhancement of individual pensions systems
(PMC 2010).
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Table 4.4.
Development of Private Pension Schemes, Turkey, 2003-2011

2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

Number of
Participants
(thousand)
15
314
673
1,074
1,458
1,745
1,988
2,281
2,406

Total Accumulated
Contributions (million TL)
5.9
288.3
1,117.2
2,592.5
3,917.1
5,467.7
7,102.0
9,515.2
10,302.8

Source: PMC 2011, http://egm.org.tr/weblink/BESgostergeler.htm.

4.3.4. The Welfare of the Old: The State

Besides co-residency and financial transfers, health care is another significant factor that
influences the well-being of the elderly. Contrary to the Social Democratic welfare
regime, there is no universal health care system in Turkey. Basic health care is provided
by the state for those who pay social security premiums. Spouses and dependent children
of the insurant also enjoy health care benefits through three different social security
institutions (these institutions—ES, SSK and the Bağ-Kur—will be examined in 4.3.4).
In addition, the poor and children under 18 years are entitled to benefit from the same
health care services without paying social security premiums. When dependants and the
poor are included, the health care system covers almost the whole population. As Table
4.5 shows, only 4 percent of the population was covered by health care services in 1950,
while coverage increased to 95 percent in 2010. People who are not covered by the health
care system are generally young people who have completed their education but have not
started working or people working informally.
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Table 4.5.
Percentage of the Insured People in the Whole Population, Turkey, 1950-2010

1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010

Active
Insured i

Pensioners ii

Insured
Dependant iii

Total
Insured
Population iv

Insured
Population
Covered by
Health
Servicesv

1.0
1.3
6.1
10.5
14.3
17.5
22.0

0.04
0.2
0.9
2.8
5.2
8.8
12.9

2.96
4.3
18.8
33.2
46.8
55.9
48.1

4.0
5.8
25.8
46.5
66.3
82.2
83.0

4.0
5.8
25.8
36.3
60.6
80.9
95.0

Sources: SSI 2011, http://sgk.gov.tr; SPO 2011, http://dpt.gov.tr.
Notes: i) Active insured covers only active workers who pay social security premium and voluntary active
insured who do not work but pay social security premium.
ii) Pensioners include retired, invalid, widow, widower, and orphan.
iii) Dependants include spouses or children of insured person.
iv) Total insured population includes active insured, pensioners, and their dependants.
v) The poor and children under 18 years old are covered by general health care system without
paying social security premium.

As Table 4.5 indicates, in 1950, the percentage of active insured people, who contribute
to the social security system, in the whole population was 1 percent. If their dependants
and pensioners are included, only 4 percent of population was covered by a social
security institution in 1950. Institutionalization of social security services gave rise to an
increase in the number of insured population over the period in Turkey. By 2010, the
percentage of insured people (active insured, dependants, and pensioners) increased to 83
percent of the whole population, while pensioners increased to 12.9 percent of the whole
population. Contrary to the dramatic increase in the percentage of pensioners, total active
insured, who contribute to the system, did not considerably increase within 60 years. The
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percentage of the active insured people consisting of active workers and voluntarily
active insured who do not work but pay social security premium was only 22 percent in
2010.

Pensions are the main resource which provides permanent earnings in old-age.
Pension income is provided by the state for those who paid old-age pension premiums.
Since these pensions are based on defined benefit pension system and protected from
economic fluctuation, retirees enjoy relatively higher incomes compared to younger
workers in Turkey. The net pension replacement rate in 2009 for an average income
earner in Turkey was one of the highest in OECD region at 124.7, compared to the
OECD average of 70.3 (OECD 2009: 121).

6

According to the OECD (2011d), public transfers are important income resources
for the elderly in many countries. As an average for the OECD countries, public transfers
account for 60 percent of average total income of the elderly, while work and capital
gains account for 21 percent and 19 percent of average total income in the mid-2000s.
However, in Turkey, in addition to pension and other public transfers which account for
46 percent of the total income, work is another significant resource adding up to 41
percent of the total income, with capital gains and investments accounting for 13 percent
(OECD 2011d).

6

The net replacement rate is the individual net pension entitlement divided by net pre-retirement earnings,
taking account of personal income taxes and social security contributions paid by workers and pensioners.
The gap between gross and net replacement rates varies substantially across countries (OECD 2011d).

100

Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of resources of pension income for the elderly in
2005. About 41 percent received a pension from one of the three social security
institutions in 2005. Approximately 22 percent received a means-tested basic targeted
pension, and the remaining 37 percent received no pension income. Many of those
receiving neither pension nor means-tested income are probably wives of pensioners,
who qualify for a survivor benefit in the event of the primary pensioner’s death. For
example, about 50 percent of the ES and 33 percent of the SSK and the Bağ-Kur
pensioners aged 65 and older are survivors or orphans who have no other registered
income (Brook and Whitehouse 2006: 19).

Figure 4.1.
Sources of income for people aged 65+ in Turkey, in 2005
SSK 13.3%
No pension income
37.0%

ES
16.3%

Basic targeted
pension
22.0%

Bag-Kur
11.4%

Source: OECD 2006, Figure 4.6, pp. 147.

As highlighted, pension is the most important income resources for most of the elderly in
Turkey. In the next part, after a brief history of pension policies, general characteristics of
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the pension systems, pension reforms and, main problems of the system will be
examined.

4.3.4.1. Pension Regime in Turkey

Even though there was no modern pension system in Turkey until the late 1940s, there
were some arrangements for civil servants during the 19th century. The first social
security arrangements for civil servants can be traced back to 1866 when pension funds
for soldiers were established. In the late 19th century, various pension funds were
established for other groups such as soldiers, civil servants, and mining workers (Ozbek
2006). In 1906, in order to create a unified pension system, different pension funds were
merged under the name of Fund of Military and Civilian Authorities. Despite this reform
attempt, the system did not cover most of the workers, including civil servants, and it was
still fragmentary.

After World War II, certain international standards in social security were
formulated by various international organizations. The most significant international
agreements approved by Turkish Governments are: the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights in 1948, International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention no. 102 on Social
Security accepted in 1952, and the European Social Security Code in 1976 (Elveren
2008b: 215; SETA 2010: 4). These conventions brought important improvements to
employees’ working conditions and social security. These international agreements
overlapped with the import-substituting industrialization economic policies based on high
wages for workers and high profits for businessmen. During the 1950s and 1960s, these
policies assisted modern social security regulations to come into practice in Turkey.
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The Ministry of Labour as well as three main social security institutions in Turkey
were formed within the framework of these international agreements. First, in 1946, the
Social Insurance Institution or Sosyal Sigortalar Kurumu in Turkish (henceforth SSK)
was established in order to protect blue-collar workers employed in the public sector as
well as all workers in the private sector against a broad range of social risks such as work
injury, sickness, and old-age. Second, in 1949, fragmentary structure of pension system
became deeper when a separate social security system, the Retirement Fund or Emekli
Sandığı in Turkish (henceforth ES) was established for only white-collar employees
working in state institutions. The ES provided its contributors with various benefits in
addition to retirement pension such as job disability pension, disability pension,
survivor’s pension, and lump-sum payments. Lastly, the Social Security Institution of
Craftsmen Tradesmen and Other Self-Employed People or Esnaf ve Sanatkarlar ve Diğer
Bağımsız Çalışanlar Sosyal Sigortalar Kurumu in Turkish (henceforth Bağ-Kur) was
established in 1971 to cover craftsmen, merchants, agricultural workers, and the
remaining self-employed people. This institution provides relatively fewer social benefits
and old-age entitlements compared to the ES and SSK. Social security coverage provided
by the Bağ-Kur was broadened for citizens working abroad in 1978 and for housewives
in 1979. Contrary to the SSK and ES, Bağ-Kur provided relatively low levels of benefits,
such as disability insurance, old-age insurance, and health insurance. A fragmentary
structure in social security also exists in the Continental and Southern European welfare
regimes. Table 4.6 presents changes in the number of insured people (active insured,
dependants, and pensioners) in three occupational social security institutions. While 36.3
percent of the insured population was covered by the ES and 63.7 percent of the insured
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population was covered by the SSK in 1970, the percentages of the insured population
were 14 for the ES, 62 for the SSK, and 24 for the Bağ-Kur in 2005. Even though the
member of all social security institutions had increased from around 9 million to 66.5
million by 2005, the increase was especially significant in the SSK and Bağ-Kur.

Table 4.6.
Insured People in Three Social Security Institutions, Turkey, 1970-2005

1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005

ES
Total
(million)
3.3
4.4
5.4
5.8
6.4
7.2
8.2
9.3

%
36.3
27.7
26.1
21.2
17.3
15.1
14.8
14.0

SSK
Total
(million)
5.8
8.2
10.7
13.6
19.5
28.5
32.2
41.2

%
63.7
51.7
51.8
49.6
52.3
60.0
58.0
62.0

Bağ-Kur
Total
Total
Total
(million) % (million)
%
0.0
0.0
9.1
100.0
3.3
20.5
15.9
100.0
4.5
22.0
20.6
100.0
8.0
29.2
27.4
100.0
11.3
30.4
37.2
100.0
11.8
24.9
47.5
100.0
15.0
27.1
55.4
100.0
16.0
24.0
66.5
100.0

Note: See list of abbreviations at the beginning of the thesis.
Source: SPO 2011, http://dpt.gov.tr.

In addition to these social security institutions for different occupation groups which
represent the inegalitarian corporatist character of the Turkish welfare regime, the
Directory of Social Assistance and Solidarity Fund (henceforth the Solidarity Fund) was
established in 1986. The Solidarity Fund is a state institution designed as a charitable
organization, which provides cash and in kind benefits for needy people based on meanstested benefits but without well defined social rights (Bugra and Keyder 2003: 36).

Due to various system changes based on populist measures, the retirement system
for the young Turkish population has faced many problems since the late 1960s. When
the Turkish social security system was first established, the pension eligibility age for
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men and women was 60 and the premium payment requirement based on level of an
individual’s income was 25 years. In 1969, pension eligibility age was abolished, while in
1976 the premium payment requirement for women was reduced to 20 years. In 1986,
pension eligibility age was set at 60 years of age for men and 55 years of age for women
(Oral 2008: 137). The last populist retirement law was passed in 1992. The 1992 law
replaced the minimum retirement age requirement by a minimum period of attachment to
the social security system. This law eliminated the minimum retirement age and set the
premium payment requirement at 20 years (7,200 days) for women and 25 years (9,000
days) for men. The 1992 legislation effectively brought down the pension eligibility
age to 38 for women and 43 for men for those who started to work at the age of 18
(World Bank 2006: 48). According to OECD (2011d) estimations in 2010, a retired
woman at age 41 with a life expectancy of 78 may enjoy an average retirement period of
37 years. Therefore, due to the early retirement options, Turkey has the longest average
period of pension eligibility among OECD countries (OECD 2011d: 29).

Numerous changes in pension laws show how populism has played an important
role in pension polices. The Turkish pension system was changed nine times over the
period 1954-1999 (SETA 2010: 12). Most of these pension laws were passed before the
elections in order to get political support. Also, there was another facet of early
retirement polices which constituted populist characteristics of the welfare regime.
Similar to the previous pension system changes, the 1992 changes in the Labour Act were
promoted not only as a gift for current employees who retired at very young ages, but
also as an employment opportunity for unemployed youth. Table 4.7 presents
unemployment rates for young and old people in Turkey over the period of 1990-2010.
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There have been significant increases in unemployment rates for 15-24 and 25-29 age
groups for both sexes for twenty years. While men’s unemployment rates for 15-24 and
25-29 age groups were 16.6 and 8.4 percent in 1990, they increased to 20 percent and
13.4 percent by 2010. However, men’s unemployment rate for 60-64 and 65 and above
age groups slightly increased from 3.4 percent and 1.8 percent in 1990 to 5.7 percent and
2.1 percent in 2010. Unemployment rates of women in the age groups 60-64 and 65 and
above declined from 3.4 percent to 1.1 percent and 1.8 to 0.1 in the period between 1990
and 2010. Hence, similar to the Continental and Southern European welfare regimes
(Esping-Andersen 1999; Myles 2002), early retirement options were used to reduce
persistent high unemployment rates when governments are not able to create new
employment opportunities for their citizens.

Table 4.7.
Unemployment Rates by Age and Sex, Turkey, 1990-2010

1990
1995
2000
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010

1524
16.6
16.9
13.7
19.5
18.3
19.6
20.1
24.4
20.0

2529
8.4
8.7
7.2
12.4
12.4
11.8
12.6
16.7
13.6

Men
6064
3.4
2.4
2.7
3.7
3.8
4.1
4.9
5.6
5.7

65+
1.8
1.5
0.7
1.1
1.0
1.2
1.2
1.8
2.1

Total
7.8
7.8
6.6
10.4
9.9
10.0
10.7
13.9
11.4

1524
15.0
13.1
11.9
20.6
20.7
20.8
21.2
25.0
23.0

2529
8.4
8.7
7.2
12.4
12.4
11.8
12.6
16.7
13.6

Women
6064 65+
3.4 1.8
2.4 1.5
2.7 0.7
0.9 0.1
0.3 0.3
0.8 0.0
0.8 0.6
0.6 0.3
1.1 0.1

Total
8.5
7.3
6.3
11.2
11.1
11.0
11.6
14.3
13.0

Source: TURKSTAT 2011, http://tuik.gov.tr.

Contrary to some countries, which face social security challenges due to demographic
factors that negatively affect financial balances and the pension systems, the problem of
the Turkish social security stems from totally different factors. According to the World
Bank (2006), about 50 percent of men age 55 and over in cities had pensions in 1994.
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The social security system began to produce a deficit in 1993, due not to population
ageing but as the result of populist policies, irresponsible use of social security funds, and
even corruption (TUSIAD 2004; SETA 2010). In order to compensate for the deficits of
the social security institutions (combined budget deficit of the pension and public health
systems), the state has contributed to the social security system through budgetary
transfers since the mid-1990s. Table 4.8 shows the budgetary transfers from the public
budget to the SSK, Bağ-Kur, and ES during the period 1998-2010.

In 1998, the total transfer to these institutions was about 1.5 billion TL
($1=1.6TL) and budgetary transfers constituted 2.1 percent of the GDP (for revenues and
expenditures of social security institutions, see Table 4.A.1). The budgetary transfers to
these institutions have significantly increased, and total budgetary transfers reached 55
billion TL, representing 5 percent of GDP in 2010. Variations in budgetary transfers
among these institutions were remarkable. Compared to other social security institutions,
ES, which covers civil servants, received relatively higher budgetary transfers despite
having fewer insured people. For example, in 2005, the budgetary transfer to the ES,
which served 14 percent of the whole insured population, constituted 1.37 percent of the
GDP, whereas it constituted 1.16 percent for the SSK—consisting of 62 percent of the
whole insured population—and 1.07 percent for Bağ-Kur—consisting of 24 percent of
the whole insured population (see Figure 4.1 and Table 4.8).
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Table 4.8.
Budgetary Transfers to Social Security Institutions, Turkey, 1998-2010 i
Budget Transfers (Million TL)

ES

SSK

610
451
1998
1999 1,035 1,105
400
2000 1,775
2001 2,675 1,108
2002 4,676 2,386
2003 6,145 4,809
2004 7,800 5,757
2005 8,889 7,507
2006 10,035 8,527
2007 12,675 14,156
2008
2009
2010

BağKur
435
796
1,051
1,740
2,622
4,930
5,273
6,926
4,330
6,229

Total

1,496
2,936
3,226
5,523
9,684
15,884
18,830
23,322
22,892
33,060
35,016
52,600
55,244

Annual
Change
in
Total
%
102.2
96.3
9.9
71
75
64
19
24
-2
44
6
50.2
5.0

Transfers as Proportion
of Total GDP (%)

ES

SSK

BağTotal
Kur

0.87
0.99
1.07
1.11
1.33
1.35
1.40
1.37
1.32
1.50

0.64
1.06
0.24
0.46
0.68
1.06
1.03
1.16
1.12
1.68

0.62
0.76
0.63
0.72
0.75
1.08
0.94
1.07
0.57
0.74

2.13
2.81
1.94
2.30
2.76
3.49
3.37
3.59
3.02
3.92
3.68
5.52
5.03

Note: i) Fiscal transfers to compensate both deficit of the pension and public health systems provided by
the social security institutions.
Source: SSI 2011, http://sgk.gov.tr.

Some of the reasons for high budgetary transfers to social security institutions are a
change in the worker to retiree balance, the informal nature of the labour market, and
poor enforcement of pension laws by the state (TUSIAD 2004; Elveren 2008a: 43). In the
late 1990s, it was apparent that the Turkish pension system was not sustainable due to a
high budget deficit. There had been various pension reforms proposed by the World Bank
and the IMF in many OECD countries as well as in Turkey (Aysan and Beaujot 2009).
The chapter will now discuss the impact of international organizations in pension
policies, the 1999 and 2006 reforms, and their influences on the Turkish welfare regime.
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4.3.4.2. International Organizations and Reform Demands

Having examined the corporatist structure of the pension system and the evolution of the
pension structure in Turkey since the 1990s, the effects of international organizations will
be discussed in this part. Social security reforms, as well as the national policy agenda in
Turkey, have been discussed by international organizations especially since the 1990s.
Orenstein (2008) highlights the decisive role of the transnational organizations in both
pension reforms and the rise of private pensions all over the world.

In Averting the Old-age Crisis, the World Bank (1994) advocated that the
economic growth of nations and the financial security of the old would be better served if
governments developed three pillars of old-age security. According to the World Bank
(1994), the first pillar aims to reduce old-age poverty. It covers the redistribution of
wealth through a publicly managed pension system with mandatory participation. The
second and third pillars cover individual savings. While the second pillar consists of a
privately managed mandatory savings system, the third pillar is defined contribution
voluntary savings. In fact, the reform proposal of the World Bank stemmed mainly from
two main factors. First, the idea that individuals should contribute more to their old-age
savings through private pensions. Second, savings could be managed efficiently by
means of a private saving system. Through this system, the state not only provides
different saving options for individuals but also shares pension responsibility with the
market.

The World Bank and the IMF policy recommendations were very important for
the stability of the Turkish economy which signed four stand-by agreements with the
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IMF during the 1990s and 2000s. TUSIAD, the strongest organization representing
business interests, supported the World Bank and the IMF policy recommendations about
state administered pension systems and the privatization of PAYG, claiming that private
pension systems will increase performance of the financial economy and individual
welfare (TUSIAD 2004).

In addition to international financial institutions, the European Union (EU) has
had a significant influence on social policies and the labour market in Turkey. In order to
join the EU, Turkey has to achieve serious social policy reforms, particularly in the
social security system to prevent poverty. For some researchers, the EU process, which
encourages rights-based and universalist approaches in social policy, mitigates the
influence of the liberal agendas of international financial institutions (Bugra Keyder
2006; Coban 2006). A report on sustainable pensions in Europe by the European
Commission (2010) indicates the standpoint of the EU on pension systems. Contrary to
the World Bank and the IMF, which emphasize re-commodification of pension systems,
the EU emphasizes cost-containment or fiscally sustainable pensions through
implementation of structural reforms such as sustainable economic growth, higher
official retirement ages, strengthening work incentives, and fiscal consolidation (EC
2010: 11). Moreover, the report warns European governments about the stability of
pension systems and mandatory privately funded schemes in the long term (EC 2010:
59). Hence, in addition to the unique characteristics of the Turkish welfare regime, the
agreements with the international financial institutions and EU accession criteria led to a
conflict between market-oriented liberal inclinations and rights-based universalist
approaches in social policies, particularly in pension policies. Within the framework of
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these international actors and economic factors, two important social security reforms
were realized in 1999 and 2006. In the next part, the reasons for the 1999 and 2006
reforms and their influence on the Turkish welfare regime will be discussed.

4.3.4.3. Transformation of the Turkish Welfare Regime and Pension Reforms after
1999

4.3.4.3.1. The Goal of Pension Reforms

Besides the external factors outlined in the previous section, the main internal factors
for pension reform in Turkey were the increasing social security deficits since 1993, and
the prospect of losing Turkey’s demographic opportunity window due to the ageing
population by the year 2035 (SSI 2004). For example, as shown in Table 4.8, despite its
young population, fiscal transfers from general budget to three social security institutions
(SSK, ES, and Bağ-Kur) comprised 5.03 percent of GDP in 2010 (SSI 2011). Moreover,
a comparative table on old-age expenditures also shows how old-age expenditures
increased in OECD countries over the period between 1990 and 2007 relative to GDP
(see Table 4.9). While France had the highest public pension spending with 10.6 percent
of GDP in 1990, Italy was the highest at 14.1 percent in 2007. Public pension spending in
the Liberal and Social Democratic countries, such as Canada and Norway were low,
whereas the Southern and Continental European countries, such as Greece and France,
had a public pension spending rate above the OECD average. Although Turkey had the
lowest public pension spending with 2.4 percent of GDP in 1990, its old-age expenditures
increased to 6.1 percent in 2007. That is, public pension expenditures more than doubled
relative to the national income over the period between 1990 and 2007.
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Table 4.9.
Public Pension Expenditures in OECD countries, 1990-2007 i

Canada
Denmark
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States
OECD

Level (% of GDP)

Change %

1990

2007

1990-2007

4.2
5.1
10.6
9.0
9.9
3.9
10.1
6.7
7.4
5.6
4.9
7.9
7.7
2.4
4.8
6.1
6.1

4.2
5.6
12.5
10.7
11.9
3.6
14.1
4.7
4.3
4.7
10.8
8.0
7.2
6.1
5.4
6.0
7.0

-1.2
8.6
17.5
19.1
20.9
-7.7
38.9
-29.8
-41.8
-16.6
119.8
1.5
-6.8
159.2
11.0
-1.5
14.5

Note: i) Public pension expenditure is public cash benefits for the old and survivors.
Source: OECD 2011d, pp.155.

In order to establish a more sustainable pension system, the Turkish state aims to keep the
fiscal deficit originating from the pension cost at less than 1 percent of GDP in the near
future (Verbeken 2007: 5). As mentioned before, such a high social security deficit does
not stem from demographic ageing in Turkey, but it stems from populist policies, poor
political decisions, and even corruption. Hence, the main problems of the past pension
systems are that these systems were organized to cover people with occupation based
social security institutions (see Table 4.5 and 4.6) and many people benefited from
pension incomes at relatively younger ages without paying adequate pension premiums
(Alper 2005: 12).
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While Turkey’s high number of young retired people poses a threat to the ratios of
active compared to passive insurants, informal employment negatively impacts the
earnings of social security institutions. Hence, the system faces double jeopardy. While a
significant number of young retirees benefit from the system, relatively low labour force
participation and informal labour force participation make the pension system
unsustainable. The percentage of the labour force with social security coverage was only
about 63 percent for men and 42 percent for women in 2010 (see Table 4.10). That is,
about 50 percent of the labour force contributes to the social security system. Social
security coverage was particularly low at ages 55-64 and 65 and older, for both sexes (see
Table 4.10). While the former is 32.6 percent for men and 8.1 percent for women, the
latter is 15.6 for men and 3 percent for women in 2010. For the age group 50-59 only
about 20 percent of men contributed to a social security institution, while about 55
percent of men aged 50-59 received a pension in 2005 and 25 percent of men participated
in the labour force informally (Brook and Whitehouse 2006: 11). Hence, the challenge
for the public budget is serious; how should increasing social security costs be managed
in a relatively young population? Next section explores pension reforms and their impacts
on gender and generational equity.
4.3.4.3.2. Pension Reforms

The law number 4447 legislated in 1999 was the first significant reform which aimed to
solve the problems of the social security system. This reform only focused on the BağKur and SSK, and excluded the ES. This reform implemented a two-pillar pension
system: the first pillar was managed by the social security institutions based on the
PAYG system and the second pillar was based on private pension schemes (Elveren
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2008a: 44). This reform increased the pension contribution period from 5,000 to 7,000
days and shortened the average benefit period by gradually fixing the minimum
retirement age at 60 for men and 58 for women over a period of 20 years (OECD 2006).

Even though the 1999 reform brought some improvements to the pension system,
it was still inadequate to achieve a sustainable and modern social security system. In
2004, a new proposal for social security reform was initiated by the government. This
reform aimed to provide wider coverage for basic health services, to reform the existing
social security institutions, and to set up a new overarching institution under a single
administrative body (Elveren 2008a).

In 2006, the new social security law was passed in parliament (see Appendix box
for the details of the pension reform). The 2006 reform consisted of four key elements
(SSI 2004). The first component of the reform is the implementation of a general health
insurance system which aims to provide equal health coverage for every citizen through
providing basic health services. The second component of the reform is to establish a
single pension system which covers different social security institutions (SSK, ES, and
Bağ-Kur) where social security rights are equal. The third element is to establish an
overarching social assistance system that coordinates all means-tested social assistances
equally, and in a manner accessible for all citizens. The last component is to establish a
new and uniform institutional structure that provides integrity in the social security
services. This law is particularly crucial in transforming the corporatist and inegalitarian
feature of the Turkish welfare regime by replacing the separate social security institutions
(SSK, ES, and Bağ-Kur) with a new and overarching institution—Social Security
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Institution. Through the new system, some of the privileges of civil servants, such as
higher incomes and pension entitlements were lowered and a relatively more equal
structure was formed.

Similar to the 1999 reform, the 2006 social security law gradually increased the
minimum official retirement age from 58 to 65 for women and from 60 to 65 for men.
However, the minimum retirement age will be 65 only by 2036, and it will be gradually
equalized at 65 for both sexes between 2036 and 2048. In addition to increasing
minimum retirement ages, the reform gradually increased the average pension
contribution period from 7,000 to 9,000 days for both sexes.

Similar to other Southern European countries, these four components of the
reform were mainly implemented to achieve the recalibration of the social security
system. Recalibration is the most important target of this reform. Recalibration means the
removal of inefficient regulations. For example, forming a new and uniform institution,
the Social Security Institution, will improve the ability of the state to accurately monitor
revenues and expenses, as well as to provide better services for its citizens (Brook and
Whitehouse 2006: 7). Increasing the official retirement age due to increasing life
expectancy can also be considered recalibration.

Introducing a single pension formula based on more sustainable parameters, and
increasing the average pension contribution period represent cost containment in the new
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7

pension system. Even though the importance of private pensions increases in old-age
welfare, the result is not the re-commodification of the pension system. This is due to the
strong support of the defined benefit pension systems by the government. Hence, similar
to the Southern European welfare regime, de-commodification remains moderate in
Turkey compared to the Liberal welfare regime.

4.3.4.4. Pension Problems in Turkey: Intergenerational Justice and Gender
Inequalities

Despite fundamental pension reforms in the last decade, there are two important
problems posing a threat for the welfare of society in terms of the pension structure and
the labour market in Turkey.

3.4.4.1. Intergenerational Justice

Intergenerational equity issues are important discussion themes in pension reform (Myles
2002; 2003). In the Turkish case, however, intergenerational equity is largely overlooked
in pension reform discussions. Two main changes in the pension system—the rising
retirement age and decreasing accrual rate—may be considered a threat to
intergenerational equity and younger generations’ welfare. While the older generations
benefited from relatively high pension incomes at relatively young ages, without paying
pension premiums for a long period of time, the younger generations must work more to

7

Net pension replacement rates in Turkey are one of the highest across OECD countries. This is mainly
due to the fact that pensioners do not pay income tax or health insurance premiums in Turkey contrary to
most of the OECD countries. In addition, the accrual rate, which is the rate at which pension benefits build
up for each year of coverage, in Turkey is very high with 2.5 percent per annum. The 2006 reform aimed to
decrease the accrual rate to 2 percent by 2016 (Brook and Whitehouse 2006: 8).
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be entitled to old-age benefits. Even though these are significant concerns in relation to
intergenerational equity, the real problem that poses a threat to intergenerational equity
and welfare of younger generations is difficulties in standard employment opportunities
for the young. Indeed, these challenges are the consequences of the transformation of the
Turkish welfare regime. This section will discuss why rising retirement age and
decreasing accrual rates are not the real problem in terms of intergenerational equity.

The first debate about intergenerational equity is that due to the increase in the
minimum retirement age, younger generations will have to work more than the older
generations. As mentioned, both pension reforms raised the minimum age threshold for
men from around 45 to a benchmark between 60 and 65. Previously, people could retire
in their late 40s and continue to work after their retirement. The average effective age of
retirement for men in Turkey was almost the same as the OECD average, which was 63
in 2005 (OECD 2011a). For example, on the standard assumption of labour force entry at
age 20, a man who started to work at age 20 in 1962 retired after 43 year of work in 2005.
Since the retirement age will continue to be 60 for those who start to work before 2008, a
young man who started to work at age 25 after completing his university degree in 2005
would retire after 35 year of work in 2040. Put it differently, compared to their parents,
younger generations will stay approximately the same period of time in the labour force.
Also, although the minimum retirement age has been increased, this will be implemented
gradually. According to the 2006 reform, the minimum retirement age for men will not be
set at age 65 until 2036. Also, the minimum retirement age for both sexes will be
equalized at 65, but only by 2048. Therefore, it is misleading to claim that younger
generation will have to work longer after the pension reforms in Turkey.
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The second concern about the 2006 reform is the reduction of accrual rates after
the reform. According to OECD projections, in defined benefit plans, pension benefits
are calculated according to the accrual rate. The accrual rate or accrual factor is the rate at
which pension benefits build up for each year of coverage (OECD 2011b). Before the
2006 reform, the accrual rates were 3.5 percent per annum for the first 10 years (or 3,600
days), 2 percent per annum between the 10th and 25th year ( 15 year or 5,400 days), then
1.5 percent per annum after 25th year of social security coverage. Between 2008 and
2015, transitionary pension rules will be applied. In this period, the accrual rate will be 3
percent for those who had already started to work in 2006. For those who started to work
after 2008, the accrual rate will be 2.5 percent per annum for every year until 2015 and
then 2 percent per annum for every year after that. After 2016, the accrual rate will be 2
percent per annum for all people (see Appendix). Put differently, people have to work
more in the formal sector for the same pension after the reform. It should be noted that
despite the decline in the accrual rate, Turkey has relatively high accrual rates compared
to other OECD countries (OECD 2009). However, since people will contribute to social
security for a longer time, decreasing the accrual rate will not necessarily imply lower
retirement incomes.

The pre-2006 pension system will continue to strongly affect retirement age and
pension benefits in the next decades (Brook and Whitehouse 2006: 12). In 2006, more
than 75 percent of pensioners were younger than the benchmark of 65 years, and this
percentage will remain high in the first half of the 21st century (Brook and Whitehouse
2006: 9). According to OECD (2006) estimations, many people will still be eligible for
pensions in their early 50s by 2020. According to Brook and Whitehouse’s (2006)
118

estimations, the only birth cohorts to encounter the impact of the 2006 pension reform
will be 1980s births cohort and over who started to work after the reform, while the
1970s-birth cohorts can still retire relatively young. Therefore, the raising retirement age
and decreasing accrual rate will not fundamentally affect pension incomes of the most of
most young adults.

The main problem causing intergenerational inequity is the lack of well-paid
standard jobs for the young. As mentioned in the previous section, the surplus labour in
the state-owned enterprises and the early retirement options were a way of welfare
redistribution provided by populist governments in Turkey in the period from the 1960s
to the late 1990s. Through relaxing retirement rules, governments aimed to guarantee
political support of middle-aged groups who would retire earlier and young voters who
would have more job opportunities because of these retirements.

As indicated earlier, populist policies that change retirement ages, are no longer a
means of welfare distribution in Turkey. The Turkish state has already privatized the
biggest state-owned enterprises, such as telecommunication, mining, and energy. Neoliberal globalization and international competition oblige private companies to recruit
contractors who have part-time unregistered workers. Until the 2000s or even later, it was
common for people to officially retire from one of the social security institutions, and
then to continue to work unregistered. This employment strategy was reasonable for both
employers who do not have to pay extra social security contributions on behalf of their
old employees, and employees who would have social security and receive pension
income, paying neither social security contributions nor income tax. However, cohorts
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who start to work after the 2006 reform will not be able to follow this strategy since they
will retire at older ages. They have to work until 65 and pay social security contribution
for 25 years (9,000 days). However, in a more fragile employment market, it might be
difficult for younger generations to find a well-paid and secure job for 25 years.

It should be noted that intergenerational equity problems arising from pension
reforms are not peculiar to Turkey and the Turkish welfare regime (Phillipson 2000;
Aysan 2011). Turkey, however, faces double jeopardy because of budget deficits in its
pension system in spite of its younger population. In the near future, when it loses its
demographic opportunity window, the financial constraints on the pension system will be
more intense. Despite the significant improvements of the 2006 reform in achieving a
sustainable and fair pension system, more needs to be done to encourage formal
employment and to decrease intergenerational inequity.

4.3.4.4.2. Gender Inequalities

In addition to the state and the market, the family is one of the important actors that
determine the characteristics of a welfare regime and gender inequality. Similar to the
Southern European countries in which the family is the main pillar in welfare
distribution, such as child care and elder care, social services are provided by the unpaid
domestic work of women. However, Turkey did not have labour policies that provided
pension benefits for mothers who were out of the labour force caring for children until
1979. A main gender inequality problem not only in the labour market, but also in
pension system stems from “the divergent gender-based care giving and work patterns”
(Estes 2005: 553).
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There are two important problems affecting gender inequality in the Turkish
pension system. First of all, similar to other pension systems in the OECD region, the
social security system is based on premium contributions. The elderly receive old-age
benefits, only if they contribute to the system or they are dependants of insurants, such as
orphans or widows. As Table 4.10 shows, in a welfare regime where a gendered division
of labour is common, the percentage of the labour force with social security coverage was
only about 63 percent for men and 42 percent for women in 2010. Even though the
number of women with social security coverage increased, particularly in young age
groups (e.g. from 43.5 percent to 57.5 percent for age 20-29) between 2000 and 2010,
women’s low labour force participation rates (e.g. urban labour force participation was
about 28 percent for women compared to 71 percent for men in 2010) pose a threat to the
welfare of women in their retirement years. TURKSTAT (2011) data also indicate that 60
percent of women were doing temporary work and 27 percent of self-employed women
did not have social security coverage in 2009. As highlighted before, since 83 percent of
the population has social security coverage, a great number of women are taking
advantage of the system through their spouses’ or father’s social security coverage. This
reconstructs the gendered division of labour and gender inequalities.
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Table 4.10.
Percentage of Labour Force (employed and unemployed) in Social Security
Coverage by Age and Sex, Turkey, 2000-2010

2000
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010

2029
53.0
56.5
58.3
62.3
66.6
64.5
65.8

3054
49.9
66.5
67.1
67.8
69.0
69.8
70.9

Men
5564 65+
42.8 24.5
33.9 20.6
32.6 19.5
28.6 14.2
29.9 12.9
31.5 13.4
32.6 15.6

Total
55.6
57.6
58.6
59.9
61.9
61.7
62.8

2029
43.5
50.2
52.5
55.4
59.0
57.5
57.5

3054
30.2
34.7
36.9
38.7
41.0
42.1
41.9

Women
5564 65+
5.2 3.6
5.7 1.8
6.0 2.0
5.3 1.3
5.9 1.3
8.8 3.1
8.1 3.0

Total
30.2
35.0
37.0
39.3
41.6
41.6
41.5

Source: TURSTAT 2011, http://tuik.gov.tr.

In Turkey, mothers who care for children and the elderly typically experience career
interruptions. However, similar to the Southern European countries, the Turkish state
expects families and especially women to bear caring responsibilities. Inadequate state
support results in lower labour force participation rates and lower pension income returns
for women. For instance, while Norway provides paid time off work up to 44 weeks for
mothers, paid maternal leave in Turkey is only 16 weeks—eight weeks of maternity leave
prior to delivery and eight weeks after the delivery. Moreover, while in many countries
childcare is considered a responsibility of both mothers and fathers and parental leave is
provided to fathers, there is only a three day paternal leave and it is only for public sector
employees in Turkey.

Second, not surprisingly, at all ages and all educational levels, women’s incomes
are relatively lower than those of men in Turkey. Lower incomes and career interruptions
lead women to have lower pension entitlements. Indeed, in order to understand gender
inequality in the labour market and its impacts on the Turkish pension system, one needs
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to differentiate women who do not have standard jobs, such as temporary employees and
unpaid family workers, and educated women who work at well-paid standard jobs.
Having a university degree significantly increases women’s earnings and narrows the
gender income gap. According to TURKSTAT (2006b), university graduate women earn
three times more than their primary school graduate counterparts. Also while vocational
school graduate women earn 33 percent less than their male counterparts, university
graduate women earn 18 percent less than their male counterparts (TURKSTAT 2006b).

In order to analyze gender inequality with regard to education level and residence,
Eleveren (2008a) projected the pension incomes of various groups for both men and
women who work 30 years in full-time jobs in Turkey. According to Elveren’s (2008a)
estimations, gender inequality in pension incomes changes with education level and
residence characteristics. The gender inequality is less in urban areas than for rural areas,
and, as the education level rises, the inequality gap narrows. For example, while a
university graduate woman in an urban area earns 57 percent of the income of a man who
has the same education, a primary school graduate in an urban area earns only 46 percent
of a man’s income. However, in the 2000s educated women who work in professional
jobs faced less pension loss (TURKSTAT 2006b).

The establishment of the private pension system in 2004 offered people
alternative pension plans. Compared to voluntary defined contribution schemes, gender
inequality problems are relatively less severe in defined benefit PAYG pensions. The
private pension plans are not designed to strengthen social welfare of all older groups,
rather they are a way of creating extra income for upper-income and middle-income
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earners who contribute to the private pension system on a regular basis. Hence, private
pension plans based on defined benefit contribution schemes would increase the gender
inequality gap (Elveren 2008a). Due to the significant interruption in women’s
employment history they may earn less pension income through private pension schemes
and this may increase the gender income inequality between men and women in old-age.

4.4. Conclusion

The welfare distribution for the elderly has become a significant social and political
challenge for many welfare regimes. For the Turkish welfare regime which is undergoing
a significant transformation, social and financial challenges are particularly serious.
Traditional Turkish families, the main actors in welfare distribution, have been
challenged by cultural dynamics, such as modernization and individualization, and
economic factors, such as increases in the number of women in paid work. These
challenges not only influence traditional families but also the welfare regime of Turkey in
general and the welfare of the old in particular. The welfare transferred downward and
upward between the younger and the older generations within the family is not adequate
to protect the welfare of the elderly. In addition to the state, NGOs and the market are
two actors that have an increasing role in the welfare distribution for the old. While nonprofit organizations seek to assist low-income elderly through cash and in kind aid, the
market targets particularly the middle and upper middle-income elderly, through private
social services, such as health care and private pension schemes.

Both the Bretton Woods Institutions (the WB and IMF) and the EU advise the
Turkish state, which has traditionally a moderate and fragmented role in welfare
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distribution, to constitute a more sustainable and stronger pension system. As indicated in
this chapter, while the former encourages the market involvement in pension plans, the
latter urges the state to reach the social standards of the EU. Demographic ageing and
increasing cost of old-age transfers from the public budget are the main problems which
the state needs to consider in pension reforms.

The 1999 and 2006 pension reforms are the result of aforementioned internal and
external factors. The outcome of the pension reforms shows that these pension reforms
were mainly implemented to achieve the recalibration of the Turkish pension system.
Increases in the minimum retirement age and payment premium requirements, the
modernization of the pension system, and unification of different social security
institutions illustrate that recalibration is the most important target of this reform. Cost
containment, such as decreasing the accrual rate, is also an important reform dynamic to
reduce the increasing cost of pension transfers. Although recommodification exists
through the introduction of private pension schemes, the relatively smaller number of
people in private pension schemes demonstrates that recommodification is not the main
factor in the pension reforms.

Even though there have been important developments in the pension system
towards achieving a sustainable and fair pension reform, the Turkish pension system has
still some problems. The pension system is an obstacle to the expansion of the formal job
opportunities for young people (see Table 4.10 for the percentage of workers who have
social security coverage). Due to high social security contributions in the formal sector,
the young retirees who have pension incomes and healthcare benefits continue to work
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informally. However, the young have to find well-paid and secure jobs to guarantee their
old-age income in a period which is marked by uncertainties and the state’s inability to
ensure full-employment.

It is worth mentioning that contrary to the general assumption that the elderly are
a burden on society, downward social and financial transfers in families show that the
elderly have a noteworthy role in the distribution of welfare across generations. In
Turkey, generous occupation-based public pensions were constituted to provide
minimum living standards for the elderly that were to be shared with young adults
through downward financial transfers within the family.

Due to their caring roles and structural barriers, women particularly face career
interruptions and lower old-age benefits. Also, private pensions based on defined
contribution systems will increase the gender inequality in the future. These challenges
deepen gender and generational problems in the pension system. Also, the first tier of the
pension structure, which provides very low means-tested benefits for the poor, does not
really consider old-age poverty and equity issues. As Brook and Whitehouse (2006)
illustrated, the means-tested pension benefits in Turkey, equal to 6 percent of average
earnings, are extremely low compared to other OECD countries in 2005. Despite the high
net pension replacement rates (for an average income earner it was one of the highest in
the OECD region with 124.7, while the OECD average was 70.3 in 2009), Turkey had a
higher gini coefficient for the elderly with 0.37 compared to the OECD average of 0.28
in 2008 (OECD 2008a).
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Pension policies and pension reforms cannot entirely be understood by financial
and economic determinants. One needs to examine social and political factors which led
to the pension reforms. The welfare regime approach provides considerable opportunities
to understand pension reforms in Turkey and the welfare of the old in particular.
Increasing social expenditures necessitate the state to collaborate with other actors.
Indeed, a question that should be asked in order to understand the welfare of the elderly is
not how the pension system should be reformed, but rather how the new Turkish welfare
regime and its actors—the family, the state, the market, and local actors—should respond
to the changing needs of the elderly.

Unfortunately, there are many challenges in examining the role of the main pillars
in welfare distribution. Data limitations on family structure, intergenerational transfers,
income variations of pensioners, age structure of aid recipients assisted by NGOs, and
occupations of people in the private pension system could be highlighted as some of the
important data restrictions. Hence, TURSTAT should attempt to provide comparable
statistical information for researchers at the EU level as well as OECD level.
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4.6. Appendices
Box 4.A.1.
General Characteristics of the Recent Turkish Pension System
Social security premium rates in 2011
Old-age and disability insurance premium: 20 percent of employee’s total income (9
percent paid by employee and 11 percent by employer)
General health insurance premium: 12.5 percent of employee’s total income (5 percent
paid by employee and 7.5 percent by employer)
Qualifying conditions
Pre-1999 reform (until 1999)
Men: 1) 25 years of insurance coverage with 5,000 contribution days, or 2) age 55 with
5,000 contribution days
Women: 1) 20 years of insurance coverage with 5,000 contribution days, or 2) age 50
with 20 years of insurance coverage.
September 1999 - October 2008 (The 2006 reform became effective after October
2008)
Men: 1) Age 60 with 7,000 contribution days, or 2) age 60 with 25 years of insurance
coverage and 4,500 contribution days.
Women: 1) Age 58 with 20 years of insurance coverage
After October 2008
Men: 1) Age 60 with 25 years of insurance coverage and 9,000 contribution days (From
2036 the age will begin to rise towards 65).
Women: 1) Age 58 with 25 years of insurance coverage and 9,000 contribution days
(Official retirement age for both sexes will be equalized at 65 in 2048).
Benefit calculation
Between September 1999 - October 2008
The pension under the scheme is based on average lifetime earnings revalued in line with
nominal GDP growth and the change of consumer price index (CPI)
Benefit calculation formula: [(1+GDP) x (1+CPI)].
The accrual rates change for different years. The pension has a non-linear formula with
years of coverage. 3.5 percent of income per annum in the first 10 years (3,600 days), 2
percent of income per annum for the next 15 years (5,400 days), and 1.5 percent of
income per annum thereafter.
After October 2008
The pension income under the new system is based on average lifetime earnings revalued
in line with nominal GDP growth and the change of consumer price index CPI
Benefit calculation formula: [(1+CPI + %30 GDP)].
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The accrual rates change for different years. The pension’s formula between 2008 and
2015 is 2.5 percent of income for every year. Starting from 2016, the accrual rate will be
fixed at 2 percent level. The pension’s formula is based on 2 percent of earnings per
annum and it cannot exceed 90 percent of earnings before retirement.
There is a floor above which contributions are required. This is 760 Turkish Lira (TL) for
the second half of 2010. Also, the value of the ceiling to pensionable earnings was 4,943
TL.
The minimum pension income in June 2011
SSK:
752 TL.
Bağ-Kur: 450TL.
ES:
900TL.
The maximum pension income in June 2011
SSK:
1,250 TL.
Bağ-Kur: 1,648TL.
ES:
4,135TL.
Targeted
The means-tested pension is payable only to those with no other social security rights
who are disabled or those who have a low living standard aged 65 and over. In Turkey,
about 22 percent of the elderly receive the means-tested pension. The means-tested
pension is paid quarterly. For the second half of 2009 the pension was 94.8 TL per
month.
Early retirement
Employees in specific industries (such as mining and military) and people with disability
can retire early but other employees cannot claim pensions before the eligibility ages.
Late retirement
It is possible to postpone the pension beyond the normal pension age.
Taxation and social security contributions of pensioners
Pension income is not taxed. Pension income is not subject to social security
contributions. Pension contribution rate (percent of gross earnings) is 20 percent of gross
income of an employee.
Dependants
Unmarried female orphans are eligible for old-age pensions throughout their lives. Sons
however, can receive benefits until adulthood.
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Private pension plans
In addition to some private sector corporations that run voluntary occupational pension
funds for managerial positions, a new private pension system established in 2001 and
became effective in 2003. The new private pension system is open to all adult
participants, who take out contracts with a pension company. There are no employment
relationship requirements. Also, employers can contribute to the individual pension
accounts of their employees. There were about 2.4 million participants by the end of
April 2011. There are currently 13 pension companies.
Contributions and benefits in private pension plans
At the end of 2007, the average monthly contribution was 112 TL. Members are entitled
to retirement benefits when they reach the age of 56 and have been saving under the
scheme for at least 10 years. Benefits can take the form of a lump sum or a monthly
annuity.
Taxation of private pension
Participants may deduct contributions from their income tax base up to a maximum of 10
percent of the gross monthly income. Investment returns are tax-exempt. As for benefits,
where a participant withdraws benefits and has contributed to the system for less than 10
years, they are taxed at a rate of 15 percent. Where the participant has contributed for
more than 10 years, but is under 56, benefits are taxed at a rate of 10 percent. If the
participant has contributed for more than 10 years and is 56 or older, benefits are taxed at
3.75 percent.
Sources: SSI 2011, http://sgk.gov.tr; OECD 2011: 314-315, OECD 2008: 288-290.

Table 4.A.1.
Revenues and Expenditures of Social Security Institutions

Year

Revenues
(Million TL)

2 000
2 001
2 002
2 003
2 004
2 005
2 006
2 007
2 008
2 009
2 010

8,576
13,361
20,018
27,917
34,689
41,249
53,831
56,875
67,257
78,073
95,273

Rate of
Increase
(%)
55.8
49.8
39.5
24.2
18.9
30.5
5.66
18.3
16.1
22.0

Expenditures
(Million TL)
10,987
17,831
27,982
41,336
50,622
59,941
71,867
81,915
93,159
106,775
121,997

Rate of
Increase
(%)
62.3
56.9
48.0
22.5
18.4
19.9
13.9
13.7
14.6
14.3

Deficit
(Million TL)

Compensation
Rate (%)

-2,411
-4,470
-7,964
-13,420
-15,932
-18,692
-18,037
-25,041
-25,902
-28,703
-26,724

78.1
74.9
71.5
67.5
68.5
68.8
74.9
69.4
72.2
73.1
78.1

Source: http://sgk.gov.tr
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Figure 4.A.1.
i
Summary of Responses to Question on “Child needs a home with father and mother”
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Note: i) Selected countries: Canada [2006], Egypt [2008], Germany [2006], Italy [2005], Sweden [2006],
Turkey [2007], United States [2006].
Source: World Values Survey Databank 2011, http://worldvaluessurvey.org/.

Figure 4.A.2.
i
Summary of Responses to Question on “Marriage is not outdated”
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Source: World Values Survey Databank, 2011, http://worldvaluessurvey.org/.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION

Over the period 1980-2010, the welfare state literature has been heavily centered on
welfare state change. There are significant number of studies on the retrenchment of the
welfare state and the welfare state crisis (O’Connor 1973; OECD 1981; Mishra 1984;
Offe 1984; Mishra 1999). In light of those emphasizing the welfare state crisis, is
Marshall (1964 [1950]) mistaken to suppose that modern citizenship based welfare rights
is the final stage reached through a historical process of development of the civil rights,
political rights, and finally social rights in three centuries? Then, is Polanyi (1957 [1944])
wrong to assume that the domination of the market on social relations through
commodification of land, money and labour in the 19th century was diminished in the 20th
century? Or to put it differently, is the market replacing the role of the welfare state? It
seems to me, although these questions are very noteworthy and provocative, they do not
help us to understand clearly the recent socio-economic developments due to too much
focus on the welfare state. As I attempt to explain in this thesis, the focus of analysis
should be the welfare regime, not the welfare state. Too much focus on the welfare state
is a hindrance in understanding challenges to the welfare of populations across societies.
As Esping-Andersen (1999: 4) highlighted, if there is any crisis, it springs from the
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interaction “between the composite parts that, in unison, form contemporary welfare
regimes”.
The term welfare regime focuses on not only the state and its public expenditures,
but also the market, the family, and local actors in welfare distribution. Hence, in the
welfare regime approach, societies are grouped not only in terms of how their social
policies are constructed by the welfare state, but also how other actors play roles in
welfare distribution. In fact, the questions that we should ask are: Which welfare regimes
face which socio-economic challenges? What are the impacts of demographic and socioeconomic challenges on welfare actors and welfare regimes? What are the responses of
welfare regimes to these challenges? Do different welfare regimes diverge or converge in
this process? In light of pension policies, I have attempted to show that, while the
challenges, such as demographic ageing, rising old-age expenditures, and new social risks
are usually similar across industrialized countries, various welfare regimes have diverse
solutions.
Polanyi (1957 [1944]) was right to assert that the market was not the dominant
power in social relations until the 19th century. Until the Second World War, families and
local actors were main players in welfare distribution. As highlighted in the introduction
chapter, the state and the market started to emerge as important welfare actors in the
second half of the 19th century. The great depression and then the huge demolition in the
Second World War had a crucial impact on the increasing role of the state in maintaining
the welfare of their citizens across Europe and North America. As Esping-Andersen
(1996: 3) asserted, many countries could achieve social security (welfare) and economic
growth (efficiency) due to the social consensus between employees and employers based
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on a full-employment promise in the postwar period. While private companies benefited
from protectionist policies designed to discourage imports, workers had well-paid
employment opportunities in the post-war era.
In the beginning of the 21st century, there have been three main challenges—
globalization, demographic changes, and new social risks—for welfare regimes (Pierson
2007). First, globalization has given rise to various economic challenges to the economic
system constructed after the Second World War. The production system has evolved
from a Fordist one based on large stocks (just-in-case), standardized products, and mass
production to the post-Fordist production system based on flexible machinery, lean
production, minimal stocks (just-in-time), and differentiated products (Krahn et al. 2007).
In addition, the characteristics of the labour market have changed since the late 1970s.
According to Bell (1976), the world evolved from the industrial era to the post-industrial
era. In the new era, the number of blue-collar workers in factories decreased, while the
number of white-collar workers increased. According to Braverman (1974), with modern
management techniques, the labour process became increasingly standardized and
deskilled. Rifkin (2004 [1995]) interpreted technological developments and deskilling as
the main characteristics of a new era in which fewer workers are needed to produce
goods and services. In addition, competitive global trade and profit maximization goals
led multinational companies to move their production to newly industrializing countries.
The impact of outsourcing is especially significant on unskilled workers in the
industrialized countries and their future pension incomes.
Second, as observed in previous chapters, the continuing change in the
demographic structure of the world’s population poses noteworthy challenges to
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societies, in terms of meeting the needs of the ageing populations. As the post-war baby
boom generation passed through various ages, it affected the relative size of the
corresponding age group (Foot 1996). Population ageing has a negative effect on
economic growth due to the old-age dependency ratio—the ratio of the population aged
65 and older to the population aged 15-64. In the beginning of the 21st century, it is
difficult for ageing populations to sustain generous retirement benefits and increasing
health costs with slow economic growth (OECD 1998).
Third, new social risks, particularly changes in family formation and “gender
roles” pose important challenges to the welfare of people (Pierson 2007: 222-223). The
rise in women’s labour force participation and their increasing roles in the work-force
have challenged traditional “gender roles” in society as well as families. As highlighted
in the fourth chapter, change in family formation is especially important to welfare
distribution. Change in families could be analyzed through two main explanations:
structural and cultural perspectives. While structural approaches mainly focus on macro
social transformations, such as modernity and industrialization (Presser 2003; Crompton
2006), the cultural approach focuses on changes within the family, such as social norms,
the meaning of marriage, and changes in gender roles (Lesthaegue 1995; Beaujot 2000).
Especially in the second half of the 20th century, in many industrialized countries,
families underwent rapid changes, such as increased flexibility in modes of entry and
exit, increased variability across families, changes in the social meaning of fatherhood
and motherhood, and changed association between gender and family earnings.
These contemporary changes pose challenges in the management of welfare
states. Hence, the main issue for many welfare regimes is how to involve the various
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welfare actors in welfare distribution. In addition, there are other problems. First, if the
market plays an active role in welfare distribution, it may lead to increased social
inequality. This is because the market cannot (does not) cover “bad risks” for people that
are frequently “the ones that are most desperately in need” (Esping-Andersen 1999: 39).
Second, if the family plays a more active role in welfare distribution, it would increase
the burden on women and thus accentuate gender inequalities (Esping-Andersen et al.
2002). For example, gender inequality is an important problem especially in the Southern
European countries where families play strong roles in welfare distribution (see chapter
4). Third, despite their noteworthy role in some cases, local actors have largely played a
residual role in welfare distribution. Lack of comparative data on local actors makes it
difficult to document the role of local actors in welfare distribution. As indicated in
Chapter 4, however, they played a significant role in Turkey over the centuries.
Hence, if focusing on other actors than the state in welfare distribution poses
threats to social equality, what is the solution? One could argue that since it is very
difficult for governments to retract social rights gained over decades, the welfare state
will continue to play an important role in welfare distribution. As Esping-Andersen
(2002: 13) has proposed, the choice of how to divide the responsibilities among welfare
actors will be defined by institutional characteristics of welfare regimes. For example, as
Myles and Pierson (2001) asserted, since pension systems are broad and deep, radical
pension reforms face negative political reactions from the citizens.
In effect, as some analysts have asserted, welfare regimes will mainly continue to
follow their traditional welfare regime paths (Esping-Andersen 1996, 1999; Pierson et al.
2001; Myles 2002; Anderson 2004; Aysan and Beaujot 2009; Aysan 2011). My thesis
142

shows how historical and institutional characteristics of welfare regimes are important in
pension reforms across OECD countries, and how welfare regimes are stable and path
dependent.
In particular, Chapter 2 shows that there are three main findings with regard to
institutional characteristics of welfare regimes based on results of cluster analysis. First,
cluster analysis findings confirm a four-fold pension typology. Hence, it reveals that
pension policy characteristics of countries can be described by referring to the much
more general welfare regime typology. Second, the findings of institutional pension
characteristics support that, contrary to the convergence thesis which asserts convergence
of welfare regimes as a result of neo-liberal policies, different welfare regimes have
followed their welfare regime paths in pension policies. Third, there are significant
differences among welfare regimes in terms of pension outcomes for gender and
generations. The Social Democratic and Continental European countries have some
similarities with regards to the different pension policy dimensions and inequalities. The
Continental European countries have higher employee costs, generous pension benefits
and high levels of labour market exclusion for younger cohorts. The Southern European
countries have generous pension replacement rates, higher public old-age spending and
pension level, but higher old-age poverty rates, and pension inequalities. The Liberal
countries have higher official retirement age, labour force participation, and pension
inequalities, but lower public old-age spending and pension levels. The Social
Democratic group succeeds best in minimizing gender inequality in old-age, while the
Liberal and the Southern European welfare regimes have high old-age gender inequality.
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Chapter 3 focuses on recent trends in pension policies in OECD countries in light
of both demographic ageing and path dependency associated with the welfare regime
typology. All four welfare regimes face demographic ageing, but the Social Democratic
countries have shown greater ability to influence the level of childbearing (McDonald
2006), along with an interest in maximizing labour force participation of both sexes to
pay for generous social entitlements. With their differential treatment of different groups
in society, the Continental and the Southern European countries have the most difficulty
in achieving reforms, and they also face the highest rates of population ageing. The
pension reforms of the Liberal countries focus on greater privatization. While the state
plays a noteworthy role in the retirement and pension systems in the Social Democratic
countries, the market remains the key actor in the Liberal countries. In other Southern
European countries, however, the family still plays key roles in caring for the elderly.
Chapter 4 is a case study to understand the transformations of welfare regimes
and the effects of pension policies on the welfare of the old. This chapter shows that the
Turkish welfare regime is undergoing transformation. Traditional Turkish families, the
main actor in welfare distribution, have been challenged by cultural and economic
dynamics. These challenges not only influence traditional families but also the Turkish
welfare regime in general and the welfare of the old in particular. In addition to the state,
the market is a welfare player that has an increasing role in welfare distribution including
pensions and health care. While the market targets particularly upper middle-income
elderly, non-profit organizations assist low-income elderly. In spite of major pension
reforms that aim to achieve a sustainable and fair pension system, the Turkish pension
system has still some problems. The pension system is an obstacle to the expansion of the
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formal job opportunities for women and youth, which poses a threat to gender and
generational equalities. In a more fragile employment market, it might be difficult for
women and younger generations to find a well-paid and secure job for 25 years.
During the last two decades of the 20th century, a neo-liberal ideology challenged
the legitimacy of the welfare state through economic globalization and labour market
transformations (Moreno and Palier 2004). Following the reform proposals of the World
Bank, the IMF, and other international organizations, the most frequent path for pension
policy reform was the implementation of private pension schemes as a supplement to
PAYG public pension schemes. Even though defined contribution private pension
schemes are important income resources for many retirees, there are significant critiques
to these plans due to low returns and high operation costs. Orszag and Stiglitz (2001)
showed that private pension schemes are not always the right direction for the welfare of
the old.
Contrary to neo-liberal convergence thesis, path dependency approach is mostly
used to show institutional variations across welfare states (Myles and Pierson 2001). As
asserted in this thesis, despite neo-liberal challenge to welfare regimes, pension reforms
have been influenced by their institutional paths that are differentiated across welfare
regimes. However, it should also be noted that small institutional changes might be of
little consequence in the short run, given the institutions that are already in place, but in
the long run they could lead to something completely different (see Palier et al. 2010).
This thesis suggests that various welfare regimes have developed their own
approaches to pension systems and pension reforms based on their institutional paths.
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The Social Democratic countries mostly focus on cost containment and to some extent
recalibration, while the Liberal countries mostly focus on re-commodification and to
some extent cost containment. The Continental European countries mostly focus on cost
containment but recalibration and re-commodification are also important considerations.
The Southern European countries mostly focus on recalibration but cost containment and
re-commodification are also important factors.
The welfare regime typology based on “ideal types” has some explanatory value
for cross-national analyses (Arts and Gelissen 2002: 13) and it is useful for mapping the
field of social policy (Beland 2010: 40). It is important to bear in mind that although
these alternative typologies have been subject to some empirical analyses, they are
generally based on theoretical assumptions. The empirical validity of Esping-Andersen’s
classification, as well as that of other researchers, might be criticized for methodological
limitations and limited theoretical reasoning (Kangas 1994; Ragin 1994; Scruggs and
Allan 2006). Despite the significant number of critiques, some studies support EspingAndersen’s typology (Wildeboer Schut et al. 2001; Powell and Barrientos 2004). Most of
these studies depend on factor analysis or cluster analysis that are better techniques to
cluster welfare states than Esping-Andersen’s ordinary least square regression methods.
In addition to Esping-Andersen’s threefold typology, the welfare state literature
includes other welfare state taxonomies. Focusing on welfare of the old and pension
policies, this thesis contributes to the literature by emphasizing the Southern European
welfare regime as a distinct fourth cluster through its unique institutional and social
characteristics. The Southern European welfare regime can be seen as a distinctive type
of welfare regime with mixed features of Beveridgean universal national health services
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and Bismarckian income transfers (Ferrera 1996). As shown in the fourth chapter, the
Southern European welfare regime is proposed as a separate cluster based on highly
fragmented and unsystematic pension system. This regime is based on a strong role of the
family in welfare distribution for all age groups and the moderate role of the state in
welfare of the old. Unlike other welfare regimes, patronage and clientelism are two
indirect welfare distribution mechanisms in this group.
In this thesis, I have used a four-fold welfare regime typology based on “ideal
types” to examine pension policies across OECD countries. This thesis shows that
pension regimes largely follow this welfare regime typology. However, as many
researchers have highlighted, there could be more variations among (for a discussion see
Arts and Gelissen 2002, and for the list alternative welfare regimes see Bambra 2007)
and within welfare regimes (e.g. Myles 1998) and the “real world” of welfare states is
likely to show more complex and hybrid forms. Hence, further research is needed in
order to understand variations in welfare distribution, particularly in pension policies,
across countries. In fact, there have been four main problems or limitations in welfare
regime research that have also influenced this thesis.
First, methodological problems in welfare regime research (for discussions see
Shalev 1999 and Scruggs and Allan 2006) and data limitations pose significant threats to
welfare regime research. For example, Shalev (1999) criticizes Esping-Andersen’s
analysis as heavily based on his personal judgments on welfare states without any
systematic statistical test, while some researchers question the goodness-of-fit of his
typology (Obinger and Wagschal 2001). In addition, lack of cross-national comparative
data makes analyzing various countries and their social policies difficult. OECD presents
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the most extensive comparative data on social policies, namely the OECD Social
Expenditure database. In addition, the SHARE (Survey of Health, Ageing, and
Retirement in Europe) data on health, ageing, and retirement, offer important statistics on
European societies. However, both of these databases cover mostly industrialized
European and North American countries. While OECD data cover 33 OECD countries
for the period 1980-2007, the third wave of the SHARE data covers only 15 European
countries. In addition, there is very limited information on the role of other welfare
actors, such as the family and local actors in welfare distribution.
Second, most of the comparative welfare regime studies focus on public
expenditures and state policies in welfare distribution. However, as indicated in this
thesis, other welfare actors—namely the market, the family, and local actors—also play
important roles in welfare distribution. Since this thesis has particularly examined public
pension policies, it has mostly focused on the state policies. Further research is needed to
understand how welfare is distributed by various actors especially for various age groups.
If we consider that welfare historically was mainly distributed by families and local
actors in history, future research should pay further attention to these pillars.
Third, most of the studies on welfare regimes and particularly pension policies
scrutinize Europe and North America. However, there are few studies analyzing the
welfare of the elderly and pension systems in newly industrializing countries (e.g. Gough
2001). In addition, welfare regimes of these countries and their responses to challenges of
population ageing are generally overlooked in the welfare state literature. Chapter 4 has
attempted to broaden the welfare regime literature by examining the Turkish welfare
regime. However, we need further comparative research particularly on East Asia,
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Eastern Europe, and Middle East which have diverse historical and institutional
characteristics affecting welfare distribution.
Fourth, one of the most important problems is little systematic attention to gender
in the welfare regime literature (Orloff 1996: 65; Benoit 2000: 21). Some analysts argue
that although the welfare state is particularly produced and consumed by women, it is
analyzed through male centered explanations (for discussions see Pierson 2007: 67-77).
An inadequate theorization of gender in welfare regime research and a failure to specify
the features of welfare provisions are the main problems of welfare state studies and
particularly Esping-Andersen’s typology (Orloff 1996; O’Connor et al. 1999). Hence, in
order to understand the effect of gender on welfare distribution and public policies, one
needs to analyze the role of gender in welfare regimes. Even though this thesis has paid
particular focus on gender in welfare regimes and pension policies, further research is
needed to understand how gender questions play vital roles in the welfare of societies,
particularly in the welfare of the old.
In light of aforementioned problems, further research is needed to elaborate the
welfare regime research. Certainly the challenges to the welfare regime studies are
multiple and any research contributing to the literature must have a broader perspective.
It seems to me, comparative welfare regime research is particularly needed to understand
how various welfare regimes have formed various responses to the similar socioeconomic challenges in the 21st century.
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